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Abstract: With the establishment of the EMU and the ECB, the interaction between monetary and
fiscal polices is now a major policy issue in the Euro-area, dealt with in detail in the Maastricht
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examine a large set of data covering major economies, including eleven out of the fifteen present
members of EU, during the past 115 years. The evidence suggests the existence of a close
interaction between the monetary regime, that is the behaviour of the central bank, and the fiscal
regime, that is the tax and spending behaviour of governments as reflected in the evolution of
budget deficits and public debt.
In the past, a monetary regime based on the commitment to convertibility of the domestic
currency into specie, the 'convertibility principle', was the prevailing pattern in the world
economy. According to this principle, the fiscal regime is subordinated to the monetary regime.
The major exception to this pattern occurred during major wars and their immediate aftermath
when fiscal demands determined monetary policy.
Since the mid 1960s and especially after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the
period 1971-73, monetary policy has abandoned the 'convertibility principle' and in many
countries has been geared towards domestic stabilization goals, especially that of full
employment. This led to a build-up of inflationary pressures in the 1970s which has been largely
rolled back since the early 1980s. In the same period bond-financed fiscal policy has been used as
a stabilization policy tool, when many countries accumulated debt to income ratios sufficient to
threaten monetary stability.
The establishment of the EMU and the creation of the Euro should properly be regarded as a
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stability as the primary goal of its policy. The present twelve members of the Euro-area are
committed to support this goal by a policy of fiscal prudence. In short, the new European
monetary regime is designed to dominate the fiscal regime in order to guarantee the credibility
and sustainability of the goal of price stability.
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A RETURN TO THE CONVERTIBILITY PRINCIPLE?




The stabilization policy doctrines that emerged after World War II combined two elements:
monetary and fiscal policies. In this study we will focus on the long run relationship between these
two types of policies. As long run patterns are considered, our study is based on the regime concept.
It is prominent in several empirical studies of monetary history.
2
We define a regime as a set of arrangements and institutions accompanied by a set of expectations -
expectations by the public with respect to policymakers' actions and expectations by policymakers
about the public's reaction to their actions.
3 The behaviour of the monetary authorities is crucial to
the performance of the monetary regime just as the behaviour of the fiscal authorities, that is the
government or the ministry of finance, determines the performance of the fiscal regime. The
monetary regime and the fiscal regime jointly determine the prevailing stabilization policy regime.
The monetary regime is influenced by the rules governing the fiscal regime and vice versa. The
evolution of this interaction over the past 100 years is the theme of this study.
In the present macro-theoretical framework, the private sector, assuming rational expectations,
makes forecasts and decisions based on its understanding of the policymakers' underlying model
and likely policies consistent with that model. Monetary and fiscal policymakers in turn make their
forecasts and decisions based on how they expect the private sector to react. Under such a regime,
the private sector's response to expansionary monetary and fiscal policies will differ dramatically in
two possible scenarios. First, if the monetary and fiscal process is constrained by adherence to the
rule of a fixed price of gold under the gold standard or to a rule restricting the growth rate of the
money supply to the long-run growth rate of the economy. Second, if price expectations are based
1 We owe a great debt to all who have helped us to compile data. We would like to thank Erik Buyst, Marc Flandreau,
Jesper Hansson, Pontus Hansson, Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur, Riita Hjerrpe, Jong Woo Kim, Jan-Tore Klovland, Albrecht
Ritschl, Roland Uittenbogaard and Vera Zamagni for support in finding data. Albrecht Ritschl has generously helped us
to contact European researchers on public finances. Pontus Hansson has assisted us in the gathering and interpretation
of data. We owe deep thanks to Jesper Hansson for his excellent statistical work organizing the data, constructing the
tables and drawing the figures.
We appreciate comments from Tamim Bayoumi, Giorgio Fodor, Dale Henderson, David Laidler, Axel Leijonhufvud,
Robert Lucas, Jacques Mélitz, Robert Mundell, Moises Orellana, Kurt Schuler and Stefano Zamagani.
2 See for example Bordo (1993a, 1993b), Bordo and Jonung (1996, 1997) and Bordo and Schwartz (1999).
3 By incorporating expectations explicitly, a monetary regime differs from the older and more restricted concept of a
monetary standard, which referred simply to the institutions and arrangements governing the money supply.7
on guessing the monetary and fiscal authorities' actions in a discretionary regime aimed at
stabilizing for example the rate of unemployment at less than the natural rate.
4
Stabilization policy regimes thus encompass the constraints or limits imposed by expectations,
customs, and the institutional framework, including the constitution and the political system, on the
ability of the monetary and fiscal authorities to influence the evolution of macroeconomic
aggregates. These constraints, determining the policy regime, are the key to understanding the
dynamic behaviour of nominal variables such as the price level, interest rates and exchange rates as
well as policy variables such as the money stock/monetary base and government expenditures and
revenues (the budget deficit), and thus ultimately the stock of national debt. They are also important
for interpreting the short-run volatility of real income and other real variables such as the rate of
unemployment.
The nature of the policy regime helps us to understand how monetary and fiscal policy actions
impinge on the economy under "normal" peacetime circumstances as well as how extraordinary
historical economic disturbances arise, such as periods of high inflation during and following World
War I and II, the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Inflation of the 1970s.
Two types of monetary regimes have existed in history, one based on convertibility into specie, that
is on an ultimate source of liquidity not under the discretionary control of the monetary authorities,
and the other based on fiat.
5 The former prevailed in various guises until Richard Nixon closed the
gold window in August 1971, thereby terminating the gold convertibility feature of the Bretton
Woods international monetary system. The latter, that is a paper standard, where the supply of
money is under the control of the monetary authorities, is the norm today. Under a fiat money
regime, nations can choose either fixed or floating rates. Macroeconomic behaviour during fiat
monetary standards may be closely related to the conduct of fiscal policies, e.g. in the case of
wartime inflationary finance or in some emerging countries today.
Monetary policy regimes have both a domestic (national) and an international aspect. The domestic
aspect pertains to the monetary arrangements, which determine the domestic money supply. The
international aspect relates to the monetary arrangements between nations. Generally, there is a
close relationship between the domestic and international aspect.
In the design of policy regimes, the choice of a nominal anchor is crucial. A nominal anchor is a
nominal variable that serves as a target for monetary and fiscal policy. Under specie-convertible
4 See Leijonhufvud (1984) and Bordo and Jonung (1996).
5 By convertibility we mean the ability to freely convert the national currency into a fixed weight of specie. This differs
from the concept of convertibility which developed after the breakdown of the classical gold standard in 1914 and is
embedded in the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement. In the latter sense, convertibility refers to the ability to freely
exchange one national currency into another one without exchange controls.8
regimes, the rule fixing the currency-price of specie (gold and/or silver coin) is the nominal anchor.
Such a standard ensures that price levels will return to some mean value over long periods of time,
provided that the relative price of specie remains constant.
A regime with a nominal anchor can be distinguished from one with no nominal anchor, where the
monetary and fiscal authorities may, for example, use the inflation tax to meet fiscal needs and
where inflation can rise indefinitely. Inflation targeting, sometimes described as “price stability”,
has been accepted by several central banks in the 1990s. This implies the adoption of a moving
nominal anchor, treating the inherited past as bygones. In this regime, although the inflation rate is
anchored, the price level will rise indefinitely (Flood and Mussa 1994).
6
Two types of fiscal policy regimes have prevailed in history. The first type is regimes based on
fiscal or budgetary outcomes that have not influenced the money supply process through
monetization of public debt. Here the monetary regime dominates the fiscal regime. Even under
these circumstances, however, the government may run budget deficits for extended periods of time
as long as the public perceives that it will service its debt in the future without resort to borrowing
from the central bank.
7
The second type is regimes based on inflationary finance, where the monetary authorities monetize
budget deficits.
8 Historically, the attempts by governments to finance war efforts by borrowing
from central banks have been a major source of inflationary finance. In this case the fiscal regime
dominates the monetary regime. The money supply is determined by fiscal policies. In times of
peace, budget deficits have been covered by taxation and borrowing from capital markets, where the
borrowing has been backed by expected future budget surpluses.
9 Since the early 1970s, deficit
6 The distinction between convertible and inconvertible (fiat) regimes and between fixed and moving nominal anchors
is related to the distinction between using the price level or the inflation rate as a target for monetary policy. Targeting
the price level (Knut Wicksell's norm) in a fiat regime, as some have advocated, is not the same as targeting the price of
specie, because of drift in the real price of specie. However, it does produce the same results as the convertible regime
of long-run mean reversion of the price level and low long-run price level uncertainty. It does so at the expense of short-
run price level variability and uncertainty, however, because the monetary authority has to deflate or inflate to correct
past mistakes. In the face of nominal rigidities this can lead to instability in real variables.
Inflation targeting, on the other hand, by building base drift into the price level, leads to increasing price level
uncertainty as the time horizon is extended. This cost must be weighed against the benefit of lower short-run price level
and output instability. See Bordo and Schwartz (1999).
7 Sargent and Wallace (1981) argue that the monetary authority cannot prevent inflation in the case of an irresponsible
fiscal authority which generates a continuous stream of primary budget deficits. Eventually they will be monetized. For
counterviews, see McCallum (1997).
8 Recently Woodford (1996) has argued that under a special set of assumptions bond-financed fiscal policy can be
inflationary, holding money growth constant. McCallum (1997), however, argues that the assumptions required to
produce this result are questionable.
9 In many developing countries with shallow financial markets and limited access to foreign capital, seigniorage is a
much more important source of government finance. See Flood and Mussa (1994).9
finance has become a regular feature in many OECD-countries during peacetime conditions. This
new pattern emerged after the breakdown of the last remnants of the gold standard embodied in the
Bretton Woods system.
2. Rules vs. discretion in policy regimes
The discussion of alternative monetary and fiscal regimes relates closely to the modern literature on
rules versus discretion and the time inconsistency of government policies (Kydland and Prescott
1977). In the simplest sense, government policy is said to be time inconsistent when a policy plan,
calculated as optimal based on the government's objectives and expected to hold indefinitely into
the future, is subsequently revised.
Discretion, in this context, means setting policy sequentially. The government is assumed to have
an incentive to adopt policies that are different from the optimal plan, once market agents rationally
incorporate presumptive government actions into their decisions. The usual example of time
inconsistency in monetary policy is surprise inflation produced by the monetary authorities in
attempting to reduce unemployment. A time inconsistent fiscal policy would be to impose a capital
levy or to default on the debt, once the public has purchased it. According to this approach, the
government would benefit from having access to a commitment mechanism to keep it from
changing planned future policy.
Alternative monetary and fiscal regimes can be classified as following rules or discretion. The
convertible metallic monetary regimes that prevailed into the twentieth century were based on a rule
-- adherence to the fixed price of specie. The rule served as a commitment mechanism for
governments to pursue monetary and fiscal policies that could otherwise be time inconsistent. This
commitment mechanism was present in both the domestic and the international aspects of the
regime. As an international regime, the key rule was maintenance of specie convertibility at the
established par. Maintenance of the fixed price of specie by its adherents ensured fixed exchange
rates. Adherence to fixed exchange rates in turn ensured that all countries would observe time
consistent domestic fiscal policy rules.
The specie standard convertible rule (with its implicit constraints on inflationary public finance)
was also a contingent rule or a rule with an escape clause. Under the contingent rule, specie
convertibility could be suspended and the monetary authorities could issue inconvertible paper
currency in the event of a well-understood, exogenously created crisis or an emergency, such as a
war, on the understanding that after the emergency had safely passed, convertibility would be
restored, most likely at the original parity. Market agents would regard successful adherence as
evidence of a credible commitment and would allow the authorities access to seigniorage (inflation
tax) and bond finance at favorable terms (Bordo and Kydland 1996).10
Inconvertible regimes can also be based on monetary and fiscal rules if the authorities devise and
credibly commit to them. At the domestic level, monetary rules setting the growth rates of monetary
aggregates or those targeting the price level can be time consistent. Likewise, budgetary rules or
norms such as maintaining a balanced budget either on an annual basis or over the business cycle
can be time consistent.
At the international level, fixed exchange rate regimes such as the EMS, based on a set of well-
understood intervention principles and the leadership of a country dedicated to maintaining the
nominal anchor, can in principle also be time consistent. The Stability and Growth Pact for EMU
should be viewed as a substitute for other mechanisms making domestic fiscal policies consistent
over time with a monetary regime based on a common European currency, that is on permanently
fixed exchange rates.
3. The macroeconomic performance of monetary and fiscal regimes
Next, let us survey the historical experience of monetary and fiscal regimes from the late nineteenth
century to the present. We cover both international and domestic (national) aspects of the prevailing
policy regimes. As background to our historical survey, we present evidence on key measures of
economic performance during the past 115 years for 14 industrialized countries (the United States,
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, Canada, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway).
The comparisons are based on annual data. We group the data according to the following
chronology of the international monetary regimes from the 1870s onwards: the classical gold
standard (1881-1913), World War I (1914-1919), the interwar period (1920-1938), World War II
(1939-1946), the Bretton Woods regime split into two subperiods: preconvertible Bretton Woods
period (1947-1958), the convertible Bretton Woods period (1959-1971), and the present regime of
floating rates between the principal currencies. This last regime is split into two subperiods: 1973-
1982 (high inflation), and 1983-1995 (low inflation). The break in 1982 signifies dramatically
changing monetary and fiscal policies among the major economies.
One important caveat is that the historical regimes presented here do not always represent clear
examples of fixed and floating rate regimes or alternatively of convertibility rule based and
inconvertible discretion regimes. In particular, the interwar period is composed of three regimes:
general floating from 1920 to 1925; the gold exchange standard from 1926 to 1931; and a managed
float for major countries until the outbreak of World War II. The Bretton Woods regime cannot be
characterized as a fixed exchange rate regime throughout its history: the preconvertibility period11
was close to the adjustable peg envisioned by its architects; the convertible period was close to a de
facto fixed dollar standard.
Finally, although the period since 1973 has been characterized as a floating exchange rate regime, at
various times it has experienced varying degrees of management. Major countries have allowed
their currencies to float against each other while minor countries have tended to tie their currencies
to a foreign currency. Moreover the period can be subdivided into two subperiods: a period of high
inflation for a number of major countries freed from the 'convertibility principle'; and a period of
low inflation with a seeming return to it.
10
In studying the evolution of monetary policies, we focus on the monetary base and the money stock
as our measures of the conduct of the monetary authorities.
11 The monetary base is our measure of
seigniorage as well.
12 To describe the conduct of fiscal policy, we examine a number of fiscal
indicators: the growth of nominal central government debt, central government budget deficits as a
percentage of national income as well as the ratio of national debt to national income.
13 These
measures reflect the conduct of stabilization policies.
14 We also consider government expenditures
as a share of national income as a structural measure.
To get an impression of the impact on the economy of monetary and fiscal policies we also examine
the rate of inflation, long-term nominal interest rates, exchange rates and real per capita growth.
Tables 1 to 11 present descriptive statistics on the macro variables for each of the 14 countries,
where available. Figures 1 to 11 display the averages of these macro variables for all the countries
in our sample. The data for each variable are converted to a continuous annual series from 1880 to
1995. The definition of the variable used, e.g., M1 versus M2, is dictated by the availability of data
10 See note 5 concerning the concept of `convertibility'.
11 In recent years a number of prominent economists have argued that short-term interest rates are a better indicator of
monetary policy than are monetary aggregates because of the problem of variability in velocity induced by financial
innovation. However, it is an indisputable fact that to influence short term rates monetary authorities will have to
operate on the monetary base (i. e. carry out open market operations and rediscounting), hence our choice of the base as
the primary measure of monetary policy, McCallum (1997). It is also impossible to find a complete set of data of the
short-term interest rates that the monetary authorities operated on over the 115 years and the 14 countries covered in
this study.
12 We use total central bank note circulation to represent the base. This measure is inferior to a correct measure of the
base, defined as currency held by the public plus commercial bank reserves (vault cash plus deposits with the central
bank) adjusted for changing reserve requirements, but it is the only measure available across all countries and regimes.
13 To simplify the cross country comparisons we ignore local and provincial (state) fiscal measures. This omission may
be important, in particular for federal states such as the US and Canada.
14 The traditional literature on fiscal policy makes an important distinction between discretionary policy and automatic
stabilisers. The difference between the two is measured by the concept of full or high employment or structural deficits
or surplus. In this paper we do not make this distinction because of the difficulties involved in measuring the structural
deficit across time and countries.12
over the entire period as shown in the data appendix. In some cases we do not have data for the first
few years of the period. If more than half of the observations for a period are missing, we do not
report any statistics. For each variable and each country we present two summary statistics: the
mean and standard deviation. The data appendix describes the construction of the data used.
For the G-7 countries and for all the countries taken as a group, we show two summary statistics:
the grand mean and a simple measure of convergence defined as the standard deviation of each
country's summary statistic around the grand means of the group of countries.
Next, we discuss the behaviour of measures of monetary and fiscal policy and other
macroaggregates under shifting historical regimes.
3.1. The classical gold standard 1881-1913
The world switched from bimetallism to gold monometallism in the decade of the 1870s. Many
nations wished to emulate the example of England, the world's leading commercial and industrial
power. When Germany used the Franco-Prussian War indemnity to finance the creation of a gold
standard, other prominent European nations followed. Sweden, Denmark and Norway went jointly
on gold as part of the Scandinavian monetary union established in the 1870s. By 1880 most
countries were on gold.
15
Until 1914 the international monetary regime based on the convertibility principle of the gold
standard served as the basic defining framework for national policy regimes. The currencies of most
countries were defined de jure and de facto in terms of a fixed weight of gold. The fixed nominal
price of gold served as nominal anchor to national monetary systems and via fixed exchange rates to
the international monetary system. Within this period, the use of national monetary and fiscal
policies for peacetime domestic objectives was subordinated to the maintenance of gold
convertibility.
Monetary policy. The convertibility requirement of the gold standard provided an effective
constraint on monetary policy. This is demonstrated in Table 1 and Figure 1 showing growth rates
for the monetary base and Table 2 and Figure 2 for the money stock for different monetary regimes.
Base and money stock growth was at a low and stable level during the period 1881-1913. The base
and ultimately the money supply was determined by the monetary gold stock under the gold
standard and new gold production was limited (by increasing costs) relative to the existing stock.
Also under the fixed exchange rates of the classical gold standard regime, discipline was enforced
15 Strictly speaking, until 1900 the gold standard period was a mixed one as a number of countries remained on silver,
e.g. Japan, or had inconvertible paper standards, e.g. Spain. Moreover, the US only formally joined the gold standard in
1900.13
by gold and capital flows. Indeed, monetary policy could be used for domestic purposes only within
the gold points that represented a target zone (Bordo and MacDonald 1997).
Fiscal policy. The classical gold standard had important implications for fiscal policy. Under the
historic convertible regime, fiscal policy was only used in wartime following the classical principle
of tax smoothing - financing of wartime expenditures by borrowing and then peacetime servicing
and amortizing the debt by taxation.
16 In the absence of such a policy, the required changes in tax
rates would severely reduce the incentives for economic activity in wartime when the need for
maintaining such activity was the greatest. Long-run commitment to gold convertibility at the
original parity and the implied commitment by the government to redeem and service government
debt at the fixed price of gold made such a policy of public finance possible.
During the classical gold standard, fiscal policy was subordinated to the convertibility rule for most
countries in our sample, thus restricting the room for fiscal measures.
17 Under the convertible
regime, money financed deficits would lead to a gold outflow and a speculative attack at the point
when market agents anticipated that international reserves would be exhausted. Bond-financed
fiscal deficits would lead to a risk premium reflecting the probability of default and the likelihood
that future taxes would not be raised. The risk-premium, other things being equal, would increase
the balance of payments deficit leading to gold outflows and a possible speculative attack (Bordo
and Schwartz 1996). Thus the gold standard acted as a 'good housekeeping seal of approval' to
insure that countries would follow prudent monetary and fiscal policies, (Bordo and Rockoff 1996).
From a stabilization policy point of view, the domestic economy was governed by a self-regulating
mechanism. There were no periods of prolonged and persistent unemployment during the classical
gold standard period comparable to the interwar and post World War II periods. Nor did there exist
the knowledge and acceptance of debt financing as part of a belief in "active" fiscal policy.
18 This is
seen below in a number of measures of the stance of fiscal policy.
Central government expenditures as a share of national income remained at a fairly stable and low
average level for all countries at close to 8 per cent during the classical gold standard period (Table
3 and Figure 3). This is the lowest level for all the regimes during the past 115 years. Central
government budget deficits as a percentage of national income was also at the lowest level of all
regimes in Table 4 and Figure 4. Central government debt as a share of national income was falling
slightly prior to World War I for the US, UK, Canada, France, and Italy. It was stable for Sweden,
16 See for example Barro (1987, 1979), Bordo and White (1993), Fregert and Jonung (1996) and Sargent and Velde
(1995) for studies of wartime financing through seigniorage.
17 Countries that were not able to maintain fiscal stability had great problems of adhering to the gold standard. This was
the case with inter alia Italy, Spain and Russia (Flandreau and le Cacheux 1997).
18 See DeLong (1998).14
Norway and Finland and rising from a low level for Germany (Tables 5 and 6 and Figures 5 and 6).
The growth of central government debt during the classical gold standard was on average the lowest
among the monetary regimes.
The growth in debt in several countries reflected a conscious attempt by governments to finance
investments in infrastructure. Much of public debt accumulation in peripheral countries in the Old
and New Worlds, e.g. in the Nordic countries, Canada and Australia, occurred in the form of
foreign borrowing from the capital markets in the United Kingdom, France and Germany.
19 The
decline in US and UK debt ratios in Table 6 reflects amortization of the public debt accumulated
during wars.
20
The price level, interest rates, exchange rates and real income. The specie-convertible regime
provided a stable nominal anchor to the price level judging from Table 7 and Figure 7. The average
rate of inflation was close to zero for all the countries in our sample, very similar to the growth rate
of the monetary aggregates during the classical gold standard.
21
Under the gold standard, the operation of the commodity theory of money determined the monetary
gold stock. According to that theory, market forces would tend to cause the price level to revert
towards its mean level in the face of shocks to the demand for and supply of gold. The process
would take many years to achieve, however, so that short-term price level stability was the
exception rather than the rule (Klein 1975). Contemporary economists like Irving Fisher, Alfred
Marshall and Knut Wicksell were concerned about this and made proposals to improve upon the
workings of the gold standard.
22 The gold standard thus seemed to anchor price level expectations.
Long-term interest rates were lower under the gold standard than under regimes that followed in the
20th century. Also long-term interest rates showed the highest degree of convergence of the means
during the classical gold standard (Table 8). These findings are similar to those of McKinnon
(1988), who views them as evidence of capital market integration under fixed exchange rates.
Convergence of standard deviations is also highest in the gold standard period.
Exchange rate movements were small during the classical gold standard as most countries adhered
to gold. Japan and Italy were exceptions in Table 9.
19 In Norway and Sweden debt denominated in foreign currencies was often around 80-90 per cent of total public debt.
20 See Barro (1979) for evidence showing a similar pattern for the UK and the US all the way back to the 18th century.
21 In addition, the inflation rates show the highest degree of convergence between the 14 countries during the classical
gold standard.
22 See Laidler (1991).15
Real per capita income growth was in the interval between 1 and 2 per cent - a fairly low number
compared with the growth performance of the post World War II regimes (Table 10 and Figure 10).
Growth was also more variable across countries under the gold standard.
To sum up, most countries shared a common norm guiding the conduct of monetary and fiscal
policy during the reign of the classical gold standard. The gold convertibility requirement
undergirded monetary and fiscal policies. This model guaranteed stable nominal performance
during this period. It also implied that short-run movements in domestic economic activity were an
outcome of the adherence to fixed rates and the self-regulating mechanism of the system.
3.2. World War I
The classical gold standard ended with the outbreak of World War I in 1914. By the eve of the war,
the gold standard had evolved de facto into a gold exchange standard. In addition to substituting
fiduciary national monies for gold to economize on scarce gold reserves, many countries also held
convertible foreign exchange, mainly deposits in London. Thus, the system had evolved into a
massive pyramid of credit built upon a relatively shrinking base of gold. The possibility of a
confidence crisis, causing a breakdown of the system, increased as the gold reserves of the center
diminished in relative terms. The advent of World War I triggered such a collapse as the
belligerents scrambled to convert their outstanding claims on foreigners into gold.
Fiscal policy. The main force producing the end of the gold standard, after the initial confidence
crisis at the outbreak of the war, was the unprecedented rapid rise in government expenditures and
concomitant rise in budget deficits caused by the war effort (Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 3 and 4).
Government expenditures as a percentage of national income trebled for the G-7 countries, from 8
to 24 per cent, while it remained practically constant for countries that remained outside the war
like Denmark, Norway and Sweden (Table 3).
Governments facing the sharp rise in expenditures had a choice between raising taxes, increasing
borrowing from the public and borrowing from the central bank. Belligerent nations relied on all
these methods of finance.
23 As the rise in expenditures was far from covered by increased taxation,
budget deficits rose sharply in the belligerent countries (Table 4). These countries resorted to debt
financing (Tables 5 and 6 and Figures 5 and 6). The volume of public debt increased dramatically
during World War I, primarily among the belligerents but also among the non-belligerents (Table
6).
23 See Eichengreen (1992).16
Monetary policy. The enormous rise in government expenditures due to the outbreak of war in 1914
exerted a profound pressure on the monetary authorities in the belligerents. The convertibility
requirement was overruled by budgetary concerns and could no longer function as a restriction on
monetary policy.
Monetary policy became subordinated to the demands for immediate financing of the war effort.
Monetary aggregates in all countries expanded rapidly (Tables 1 and 2). The monetary base grew by
28.8 per cent per annum as an average for all countries during World War I compared to a growth
rate of 2.9 per cent during the classical gold standard. The corresponding number for the money
supply is 22 per cent and 4.7 per cent, respectively. The belligerents turned to the use of the
inflation tax (seigniorage) as the cost of raising conventional taxes and borrowing mounted. Table
11, displaying seigniorage as a percentage of national income under different monetary regimes,
demonstrates the importance of the inflation tax during World War I. Seigniorage revenue during
the war was more important for Germany (7.3 per cent of national income) and France (6.0 per cent
of national income) than for the UK (1.4 per cent of national income) and the US (0.4 per cent of
national income) (Table 11). As we argue below, this in turn seriously hampered the ability of the
former countries to deflate and establish financial order after the war.
The rise in the money supplies in the warring economies spread to neutral countries as well which
experienced a sudden boom in exports and massive inflow of foreign exchange, increasing their
money supplies.
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The price level, interest rates, exchange rates and real income. The price level in the world economy
rose sharply during World War I in the absence of the golden nominal anchor (Table 7). The rise in
prices (20 per cent) is roughly of the same order as the growth in the money supply (22 per cent).
Nominal interest rates, however, did not display much movement according to Table 8, rising from
3.6 per cent as an average during the classical gold standard to 4.7 per cent as an average during
World War I. The small rise, we conjecture, partially reflects widely held expectations that interest
rates would return to pre-war levels after the end of the war, as well as interest pegging policies
followed by the US, UK, Canada and other countries.
25 Exchange rates displayed wide movements
as expected under unstable monetary conditions (Table 9). Real income growth turned negative in
most countries engaged in war (Table 10).
To sum up, World War I marked a sharp difference in the conduct of fiscal and monetary policies in
the global economy. It destroyed the world that had seen the gold standard evolve into the
24 A country like Sweden used part of its export revenues to redeem the foreign debt that it had accrued to finance
investments during the classical gold standard - one of the beneficial effects of neutrality.
25 For the US see Toma (1997).17
international monetary system. A return to a stable monetary system was high on the political
agenda after the Versailles peace treaty.
3.3. The interwar period
The interwar period is a period of several regimes: first, the return to gold which occurred in the
mid 1920s, second, the short-lived international gold standard, and third, the breakdown of the gold
standard during the Great Depression in the 1930s. After World War I governments wanted a return
to stable monetary conditions. This step required two major decisions concerning fiscal and
monetary policy. First, in several of the belligerent countries a decision had to be made concerning
the treatment of public debt, that is over the time path of budget surpluses to amortize debt
outstanding. Governments had to make a choice whether to run contractionary fiscal policies, which
would retire debt outstanding, or else default explicitly or implicitly via inflation. Any decision
would have profound effects on the distribution of income between debtors and creditors.
Germany eventually defaulted on its debt through hyperinflation.
26 France defaulted partially by
running high inflation. She returned to gold convertibility in 1926 at a greatly devalued parity. The
French return to gold occurred after a long period of domestic political fighting over the treatment
of public debt. The United Kingdom as well as the US honoured their debt by running budget
surpluses to amortize it.
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Second, related to the treatment of debt, several countries had to decide to accept the inflation path
developed during the war or to carry out a deflationary policy to bring about a return to gold at the
pre-war parity rate. That is they had to make a choice of devaluing or deflating their currencies after
the wartime inflation. Countries with the highest rates of inflation decided to settle for ex post
devaluations, returning to gold at a devalued rate compared to the pre-1914 rate. The cost of
deflation was considered too high compared to the benefits.
28
The gold standard was reinstated after World War I as a gold exchange standard. Britain and other
countries, alarmed by the post-war experience of inflation and exchange rate instability, were eager
to return to the halcyon days of gold convertibility before the war. The system re-established in
26 Hyperinflations are closely associated with large budget deficits. Budgetary balance, often budgetary reform, was a
necessary step to end hyperinflation after World War I. See e.g. Sargent (1982).
27 See Ritschl (1996) for a comparison of the debt policies of France, Germany and the UK after World War I.
28 Finland and Sweden makes an interesting comparison. Both countries were facing the same dilemma: should they go
back to the original gold parity rate of their currencies in the 1920s? Sweden settled for a return to the pre-1914 dollar
rate, bringing about a deep depression, actually deeper than during the 1930s. Finland, as a newly established
independent country, after fighting a war with Russia as well as a civil war, decided to go back to a fixed gold rate at
the going rate, avoiding deflation and depression (Haavisto and Jonung 1995).18
1925 was an attempt to restore the old regime but to economize on gold in the face of a perceived
gold shortage. Based on principles developed at the Genoa Conference in 1922, members were
encouraged to adopt central bank statutes that substituted foreign exchange for gold reserves and
discouraged gold holdings by the private sector. The new system only lasted for six years,
crumbling after Britain's departure from gold in September 1931. The system failed in the face of
major economic disturbances because of several fatal flaws in its structure and because it did not
embody a credible commitment mechanism.
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After the collapse of the gold exchange standard, the world in the 1930's retreated towards autarky.
Policies widely followed include trade restrictions, exchange controls and bilateralism. The
disappearance of the gold standard also allowed for new experiments in monetary and fiscal
policies. Some countries adopted expansionary fiscal programs, perhaps most prominently Sweden,
with its expansionary "crisis policy" based on the explicit idea that the budget should be balanced
over the business cycle, not on an annual basis. In a search for a new nominal anchor to replace the
gold standard, Sweden also was the first country to introduce a program of price stabilization based
on Knut Wicksell's norm. One of the major arguments proposed for the program was to influence
price expectations.
30
Monetary base and money stock growth fell back to the lowest average level of all regimes in the
interwar period (Tables 1 and 2).
31 This is reflected in deflation in most countries (Table 7).
32 After
World War I government expenditures as a share of national income declined, most prominently
among the former belligerent countries. The decline, however, did not imply a return to pre-1914
levels. The ratio then started to rise in the 1930s as a result of the Great Depression, reducing
national income levels and increasing government expenditures (Table 3 and Figure 3). Budget
deficits remained small, however (Table 4 and Figure 4). Central government debt as a share of
national income remained at an average level above the level reached during World War I (Table
5). The 1930s were hardly a period of "Keynesian" expansionary fiscal policies judging from the
size of budget deficits and growth in the interwar period.
33
29 The fatal flaws included: the adjustment problem (asymmetric adjustment between deficit countries (Britain) and
surplus countries (France and the United States); the failure by countries to follow the rules of the gold standard game,
(e.g. both the US and France sterilised gold flows); the liquidity problem (inadequate gold supplies, the wholesale
substitution of key currencies for gold as international reserves leading to a convertibility crisis when countries
subsequently tried to convert the key currencies back into gold); and the confidence problem leading to sudden shifts
among key currencies and between key currencies and gold (Bordo 1993b, Eichengreen 1992).
30 See Jonung (1979) for an account of the Swedish fiscal and monetary programs in the 1930s.
31 However, in the US and other countries, for example Germany, M2 declined relative to the base reflecting banking
panics.
32 World wide deflation in turn may reflect an overall gold shortage after World War I as argued by for example Gustav
Cassel. See Eichengreen (1992).
33 See DeLong (1998).19
Exchange rates exhibited considerable volatility in this period (Table 9). Real growth was at its
lowest and most volatile for most major countries as would be expected (Table 10).
3.4. World War II
The outbreak of war in 1939 caused an immediate and extremely sharp rise in government
expenditures, actually sharper than in 1914 (Figure 3). Governments were faced with the same
financing problems as during World War I. Budget deficits as a share of national income averaged
higher than during World War I (Table 4). Central government expenditures and debt as a
percentage of national income reached an all time high for many countries, for example in the UK,
US and Canada (Table 5). The monetary aggregates as well as the price level increased sharply,
moving on average in a way very similar to the pattern of World War I (Tables 1, 2 and 7), although
price controls were used more effectively than during World War I. Seigniorage reached high levels
in many of the belligerents, while remaining low in the US and the UK as was the case during
World War I (Table 11).
34 Furthermore, both short and long term interest rates were pegged at low
levels in all countries to aid the fiscal authorities in financing government expenditures (Table 8).
World War II presents a pattern very similar to World War I. A sudden, exogenously produced rise
of government expenditures forced monetary policy to serve the war effort. The same pattern is
found among the neutral countries that stayed out of the war.
3.5. The Bretton Woods period 1947-1971
The Bretton Woods System was designed to incorporate the perceived lessons of the monetary
turmoil of the interwar period. Bretton Woods was the last convertible global regime. It can be
viewed within the context of the gold standard because the United States (the most important
commercial power) defined its parity in terms of gold and all other members defined their parities in
terms of dollars.
The Articles of Agreement signed at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944 represented a
compromise between American and British plans. They combined the flexibility and freedom for
policy makers of a floating rate system, which the British team, wanted, with the nominal stability
of the gold standard rule emphasized by the US. The system established was a system of pegged
exchange rates but members could alter their parities in the face of a fundamental disequilibrium.
34 The UK followed Keynes' prescription to finance the war to a large extent by taxes whereas the US and other
countries followed classical tax smoothing policies. According to Cooley and Ohanian (1997) this departure from
optimal public finance doomed the UK to lower growth after the war than otherwise would have been the case.20
Members were encouraged to use domestic stabilization policy to offset temporary disturbances.
Thus the Agreement explicitly made room for discretionary monetary and fiscal policies, whose use
at best was minimal under the classical gold standard. These policies would be effective because of
the presence of capital controls. The International Monetary Fund was to provide temporary
liquidity assistance and to oversee the operation of the system.
Although based on the principle of convertibility and although it became an asymmetric system,
with the US rather than England as the center country, Bretton Woods, differed from the classical
gold standard in a number of fundamental ways. First, it was an arrangement mandated by an
international agreement between governments, whereas the gold standard evolved more informally
in a less centralized way. Second, domestic policy autonomy was encouraged even at the expense of
convertibility - in sharp contrast to the gold standard where convertibility was the key feature.
Third, capital movements were suppressed by controls.
The flaws of Bretton Woods echoed those of the gold exchange standard. Adjustment was
inadequate, prices were downwardly inflexible and declining output was prevented by expansionary
financial policy. Under the rules the exchange rate could be altered but in practice rarely was
because of the fear of speculative attacks, which in turn reflected market beliefs that governments
would not follow the policies necessary to maintain convertibility (Eichengreen 1996). Hence the
system in its early years was propped up by capital controls and in its later ones by G-10
cooperation. The liquidity problems resembled those of the interwar gold exchange standard. As a
substitute for scarce gold, the system relied increasingly on US dollars generated by persistent US
balance of payments deficits. The French resented the resultant asymmetry between the US and the
rest of the world. The growing risk of a run, as outstanding dollar liabilities increased relative to
gold reserves, meant that the Bretton Woods system experienced a mounting confidence problem.
The Bretton Woods system collapsed between 1968 and 1971. The United States broke the implicit
rules of the dollar standard by not maintaining price stability, that is by expansionary monetary and
fiscal policies. The rest of the world did not want to absorb additional dollars and thus accept
inflation. Surplus countries (especially Germany) were reluctant to revalue.
Another important source of strain on the system was the unworkability of the adjustable peg as
capital mobility increased. Neither traditional policies nor international rescue packages could stop
speculation against a fixed parity. The British eventually joined the French in forcing the
Americans' hands by converting dollars into gold in the summer of 1971. President Richard Nixon’s
closing of the gold window on August 15, 1971 ended the impasse.
Bretton Woods, like the gold standard, can be interpreted as a regime following a contingent rule.
Unlike the example of Britain under the gold standard, however, the commitment to maintain gold
convertibility by the US, the center country, lost credibility by the mid 1960s. Also the contingency21
aspect of the rule proved unworkable. Besides being ill defined, devaluations were avoided because
they were viewed as an admission that policies lacked credibility because they were accompanied
by speculative attack even in the presence of capital controls. Once controls were removed the
system was only held together by G-10 Cupertino and once inconsistencies developed between the
interests of the US and other members, even co-operation became unworkable.
In conclusion, under Bretton Woods gold still served as a nominal anchor. This link to gold was
constraining US monetary policy (at least until the mid 1960s) and therefore that of the rest of the
world. This may explain the low inflation rates - see Table 7 - and the low degree of inflation
persistence observed in the 1950s and 1960s (Alogoskoufis and Smith, 1991; Bordo, 1993a).
However, credibility was considerably weaker than under the gold standard.
The dollar-gold standard was thus not as effective a nominal anchor as the classical gold standard
(Giovannini 1993). Moreover, when domestic interests clashed with convertibility, the anchor chain
was stretched and then overthrown (Redish 1993). This was evident in the US reduction and then
removal of gold reserve requirements in 1965, the closing of the Gold Pool in 1968 and of the gold
window itself in 1971. The absolute termination of a role for gold in the international monetary
system was the Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement in 1976.
Monetary Policy. Monetary base and money stock growth began to increase in the US in the mid
1960s, reflecting expansionary policy by the US in the financing of the Vietnam War and the Great
Society. This was transmitted to the rest of the world via fixed exchange rates. At the same time
European countries began following Keynesian full employment policies.
35 The inflation rate began
rising in this period. A growing tension between the expansionary monetary policies of the center
country, the US, and the main European countries who imported inflation via persistent balance of
payments surpluses, helped precipitate the collapse of the system between 1968 and 1973 (Bordo
1993b).
Fiscal Policy. During the Bretton Woods period fiscal policy was initially consistent with the
monetary regime. As in the post World War I period, government expenditures as a share of
national income dropped sharply after World War II and stabilized at a level between 15 and 20 per
cent of national income in the 1950s and early 1960s (Table 3). A major aim of fiscal policy was to
amortize the public debt. Budget deficits reached a low, on average less than 2 per cent of national
income (Table 4).
During the convertible phase of the Bretton Woods system from 1959 to 1971, the advanced
countries enjoyed exceptional macroeconomic performance. It had the lowest and most stable
inflation rate and like the classical gold standard period, long-term interest rates were low, stable
35 See for example Bispham and Boltho (1982) on demand management policies in post World War II Europe.22
and exhibited a high degree of convergence (Table 8). Moreover, real growth rates were the highest
and most stable of any modern regime (Table 10).
Although aggregate demand and supply shocks were smaller than under the gold standard, the
convertible phase of the Bretton Woods system was short-lived (Bordo 1993a, Bayoumi and
Eichengreen 1994). This suggests that the reason for its brief existence was not the external
environment but, like the gold exchange standard, structural flaws in the regime and the lack of a
credible commitment mechanism.
3.6. Floating Exchange Rates 1973-1995
After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the major countries turned to floating exchange
rates in March 1973. This meant that major nations used stabilization policy to a larger extent than
previously to satisfy domestic goals, paying less attention to external considerations. In the early
years of the floating, exchange rate were often characterized as a dirty float, in that monetary
authorities intervened extensively to affect exchange rate levels as well as their volatility. By the
end of the 1970s, it evolved into a system where exchange market intervention occurred primarily
to smooth out fluctuations, however.
In recent years, floating exchange rates have been assailed from many quarters for excessive
volatility in both nominal and real exchange rates, increasing macroeconomic instability and raising
the costs of international transactions. Despite these perceived problems, the ability of the flexible
regime to accommodate the problems of the massive oil price shocks of the 1970s and other shocks
in subsequent years without significant disruption, and the perception that pegged exchange rate
arrangements amongst major countries are doomed to failure, the prospects for significant reform of
the present system at the world level seem remote. Indeed, the lessons from recent history suggest
that major countries are not willing to subject their domestic policy autonomy to that of another
country whose commitment cannot be ensured in an uncertain world or to a supranational monetary
authority they cannot control.
Monetary policy. Base and money growth increased in the decade following the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system (Tables 1 and 2). The 1970s was a period of rapid money growth and high
inflation as monetary authorities in most countries, following the two oil price shocks, were
unwilling to conduct anti-inflationary policies that would jeopardize their primary goal of full
employment. At the end of the decade under pressure of an electorate and a professional opinion
critical of high inflation, policies were reversed in major OECD-economies.
36
36 See for example Thygesen (1982) on monetary policies in Europe. To our knowledge, there is no comparative
account of the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies for the OECD-countries for the whole post World War II period.23
After a sharp recession in the early 1980s, inflation returned to the levels prevalent in the early
Bretton Woods years. Along with disinflation, nominal interest rates declined significantly during
the 1980s. The period of high inflation, followed by disinflation was also associated with lower real
growth than under Bretton Woods (Tables 7 and 10).
Fiscal policy. The disappearance of a global regime of fixed exchange rates relaxed the fiscal norm
that had accompanied the Bretton Woods system. The negative macroeconomic disturbances caused
by the two oil price shocks induced many countries to increase government expenditures - the ratio
of government expenditures to national income reached a level above that of World War II in
several countries (Figure 5). Many countries resorted to debt finance (Tables 4-6).
On average nominal debt as a percentage of national income increased from 34.5 percent for the
convertible Bretton Woods period to 50.2 percent for the period 1983-1995 (Table 5). The ratio did
not expand in a uniform way across countries, however. We may distinguish one group of steadily
rising ratios from the early 1970s (Japan, Canada, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark and
Sweden) and one group with stable or falling ratios (US, UK, Germany, France, Finland and
Norway) prior to the crises of the 1990s.
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The European Monetary System. After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, Europe has
been moving towards creating a monetary union with perfectly fixed exchange rates. This reflects
the desire of the members of the European Union for economic and political integration. On the
road to that end, the Exchange Rate Mechanism within the European Monetary System, established
in 1979, was modeled after Bretton Woods (although not based on gold), with more flexibility and
better financial resources (Bordo 1993a). It appeared successful in the late 1980s when member
countries followed policies similar to Germany, the center country.
The ERM broke down in 1992-93 in a manner similar to the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1968-71.
It also collapsed for similar reasons - because pegged exchange rates, capital mobility and policy
autonomy do not mix. It collapsed in the face of massive speculative attacks on countries following
policies inconsistent with their pegs to Germany and also on countries which seemingly were
following the rules, but whose ultimate commitment to the peg in the face of rising unemployment
was doubted by agents in financial markets. The policy responses to the reunification of Germany
were instrumental in initiating the breakdown of the ERM.
A major problem facing the European countries has been to co-ordinate their fiscal and debt
policies. Countries with relatively high public deficits and thus rising public debt like Italy have not
37 There is so far no satisfactory explanation for this divergent pattern (Alesina and Perotti 1995). For the case of
Sweden with one of the most volatile debt to income ratios of among OECD countries, see Persson (1996).24
been able to pursue as tight monetary policies as Germany. The Stability and Growth Pact and other
procedures to ensure fiscal prudence within the Euro-area are designed to bring about the fiscal
discipline deemed necessary for the future sustainability of EMU.
4. Summary of the empirical evidence
Let us briefly summarize the descriptive data displayed in the figures and tables in order to examine
the differences and similarities between historical regimes. Before doing so, however, we briefly
consider some theoretical issues concerning regime choice.
Traditional theory posits that a convertible regime, such as the classical gold standard which
prevailed from around 1880 until the outbreak of World War I, is characterized by a set of self-
regulating market forces that tend to ensure long-run price level stability. These forces operated
through the mechanism commonly described by the classical commodity theory of money (Bordo
1984). According to that theory, changes in gold production will eventually offset any inflationary
or deflationary price level movements. The problem, however, is that unexpected shocks to the
supply or demand for gold can have significant short-run effects on the price level.
In an international convertible regime, pegging nations' currencies to the fixed price of gold
provides a stable nominal anchor to the international monetary system. Such stability, however,
comes at the expense of exposure to foreign shocks, which can produce volatile output and
employment. Adherence to the international convertible regime also implies a loss of monetary and
fiscal independence since under such a regime the authorities' prime commitment is to maintain
convertibility of their currencies into the precious metal and not to stabilize the domestic economy.
In a fiat money regime, in theory, monetary authorities could use open market operations, or other
policy tools, to avoid the types of shocks that may jar the price level and real activity under a specie
standard and hence provide both short-run and long-run nominal stability. It also allows greater
fiscal policy autonomy. In addition to giving the authorities policy independence, adhering to a
flexible exchange rate fiat regime provides insulation against foreign shocks.
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As in a convertible regime, countries following fiat money regimes can adhere to fixed exchange
rates with each other. The key advantage of doing so is to avoid the transaction costs of exchange in
international trade. However, a fixed rate system based on fiat money does not provide the stable
38 Theoretical developments in recent years have complicated the simple distinction between fixed and floating
exchange rates. In the presence of capital mobility, currency substitution, policy reactions and policy interdependence,
floating rates do not necessarily provide complete insulation from either real or monetary shocks (Bordo and Schwartz,
1989). Moreover, according to recent real business cycle approaches, there may be no relationship between the
international monetary regime and the transmission of real shocks. (Baxter and Stockman 1989).25
nominal anchor of the specie convertibility regime unless all the members define their currencies in
terms of the currency of one dominant country, for example the US under Bretton Woods or
Germany in the EMS, which in turn follows a rule which requires it to maintain price stability.
Finally, in a fiat money flexible rate regime, the absence of the nominal anchor of the fixed price of
specie opens up the possibility that monetary authorities, to satisfy the political goals of the
government, for example its fiscal demands or demands to maintain full employment, may use the
printing press to engineer high inflation.
The theoretical literature concludes that it is difficult to provide an unambiguous ranking of
monetary and fiscal arrangements. Hence, empirical evidence is crucial in assessing the
performance of alternative regimes. In what follows we summarize the evidence on the different
measures of stabilization policies and the macroaggregates considered in section 3.
Monetary policy:
The monetary base and the money stock. During peacetime conditions, base money and broad
money growth (M2) were considerably more rapid across all countries after World War II than
before the war (Tables 1 and 2). There is not much difference between Bretton Woods and the
subsequent floating regime or between the preconvertibility period and the convertibility period.
The growth rates of the monetary base and the money stock showed the most convergence during
the fixed-exchange-rate gold standard and the greatest divergence during the preconvertible Bretton
Woods period. The two world wars stand out as a period of high and variable monetary aggregate
growth, especially during World War I. In recent years we have seen a decline in monetary
aggregate growth and in inflation and thus a return to earlier norms.
Fiscal policy:
Government expenditures less tax revenues. The budget deficit was low during all convertible
regimes. Large deficits, which occurred during three episodes: World War I and II and during the
floating exchange rate period, were not consistent with fixed exchange rates. The evidence of large
deficits during the world wars is consistent with optimal public finance/tax smoothing. Surpluses
after both world wars were used to amortize public debt. Large and persistent deficits in peacetime
under the managed float, however, are inconsistent with the rules of convertible regimes.
Central government debt. The debt to income ratio prior to 1970 is determined by one major force,
the occurrence of wars (Figures 3 and 4). After World War I, debt was reduced by governments
running surpluses in major countries like the US, UK and Canada as well as in the small non-26
belligerent European countries but not in France, Germany and Italy. After World War II, public
debt was largely reduced by inflation, a phenomenon inconsistent with classical tax smoothing
(Grossman 1990). Under the Bretton Woods system, most countries exhibited falling debt to
national income ratios.
In the post-Bretton Woods period we observe rising and high ratios. This reflects amongst other
things activist stabilization policy, an increased role for governments and the absence of the
constraints of a convertible regime. Differences across countries in their debt behaviour in turn are
reflected in differences in inflation rates and exchange rate behaviour.
In the 1990s, we observe a decline in the debt to income ratios for some countries as well as a sharp
rise in the ratios for others. We conjecture that this pattern reflects inter alia, asymmetric shocks and
different policy preferences.
Seigniorage. Seigniorage revenue measured as a share of national income represents a major source
of revenue only during World War I and II in our sample of advanced countries (Table 11). Great
differences across countries appeared in the wartime deficits financed by seigniorage. Countries like
Germany and France, which resorted to inflation finance, had serious difficulties in returning to
financial stability after the war.
Seigniorage as defined here is lowest in the 1970s and 1980s when the rate of inflation was
relatively high. In our calculations of the inflation tax we ignore the fall in the real value of public
debt caused by inflation. Thus our measure gives a minimum estimate of the inflation tax. See
Grossman (1990).
Central government expenditures to national income. This structural measure, reflecting the attitude
of the electorate towards public/private solutions to economic problems, has been rising since
World War I. Following the sharp increase during the war; it declined in the 1920s almost to the
pre-1914 level. Then it started on a new increase during the Great Depression, accelerating during
World War II, declining after the war to slightly above the pre-war level. Then a large peacetime
increase commenced in the late 1960s to be halted by the 1980s.
Inflation. The rate of inflation was lowest during the classical gold standard period (Table 7). This
was true for every country except Japan, which did not adopt the gold standard until 1897. During
the interwar period, mild deflation prevailed. The rate of inflation during the Bretton Woods period
was on average and for every country except Japan lower than during the subsequent floating
exchange rate period.27
During the Bretton Woods convertible period, the inflation rate in most countries was lower than in
the preceding preconvertible subperiod; the reverse was true for Germany, Switzerland and
Denmark. During the floating regime, inflation was much lower on average in the 1980s than in the
1970s.
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In general, the descriptive evidence of lower inflation under the gold standard and the Bretton
Woods convertible regime than is the case for the other regimes is consistent with the view that
convertible regimes provide an effective nominal anchor. The markedly low inflation of the 1990s
suggests that the equivalent of the convertibility principle may be operating presently. At the same
time, evidence that inflation variability on average was higher in the classical gold standard period
than in most other regimes is consistent with the workings of the commodity theory of money and
the price-specie-flow-mechanism. Alternatively, stabilization policies in the post World War II
period may have contributed to lower inflation variability.
The evidence on inflation and inflation variability is also consistent with the behaviour of two other
nominal variables. First, as pointed out above money growth was generally lowest under the
classical gold standard and during the interwar period across all countries. Second, long term
nominal interest rates were lowest during the classical gold standard period. During Bretton Woods
they were lower than in the recent float (also see McKinnon 1988).
Real per capita GNP. Generally, the Bretton Woods period, especially the convertible period
exhibited the most rapid output growth of any monetary regime for 14 countries (Table 10). Output
variability was also lowest in the convertible subperiod of Bretton Woods, but because of higher
variability in the preconvertible period, the Bretton Woods system as a whole was more variable
than the floating period. Both pre-World War II regimes exhibit higher variability than their post-
World War II counterparts.
41 42
39 The dispersion of inflation rates between countries was lowest during the classical gold standard and to a lesser extent
during the Bretton Woods convertible subperiod compared to the floating rate period and the mixed interwar regime
(Bordo 1993b). This evidence is consistent with the traditional view of the operation of the classical price-specie-flow
mechanism and commodity arbitrage under fixed rates and insulation and greater monetary independence under floating
rates.
40 Supporting evidence is provided in a recent study by Ghosh et al (1996). Classifying the exchange rate systems for
136 countries over the period 1960 to 1990 into pegged, intermediate, and floating, they adopt a methodology similar to
that of Table 7. They use a nine category classification scheme, distinguishing between different types of pegged and
floating regimes. They find that the unconditional mean inflation rate for countries on pegged exchange rates was
significantly lower than for those that did not peg. This result holds up, controlling for the 1960s during which most
countries adhered to Bretton Woods. The only exception was high-income floating countries which had lower than
average inflation rates. Their results are unchanged when conditioned on a set of determinants of inflation, and when
account is taken of possible endogeneity of the exchange rate regime.
41 The Bretton Woods regime also exhibited the lowest divergence of output variability between countries of any
regime, with the interwar regime the highest. The greater convergence of output variability under Bretton Woods may
reflect conformity between countries' business fluctuations, created by the operation of the fixed-exchange rate regime.
It may also be due to the use of fiscal policies to counteract business fluctuations.28
To link rapid growth in the industrialized countries in the quarter century following World War II to
the Bretton Woods international monetary system (Bretton Woods Commission 1994), seems less
compelling than for various aspects of macroeconomic performance. There is little conclusive
evidence linking exchange rate volatility to either trade flows or the level of investment, avenues by
which a stable exchange rate regime might have affected economic growth.
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More likely, the Bretton Woods arrangements contributed to post-war growth by being part of the
overall package creating political and economic stability - `the Pax Americana,' that was a reaction
to the chaos of the interwar and World War II periods. In this view, rapid post-war growth
represented a `catch up' by the European nations and Japan from low levels of per capita output
compared to those of the leading industrial country, the US. The US encouraged the `catch up’ by
these nations. They adopted the leader's best-practice technology and hence grew at a much more
rapid rate than before (Abramovitz 1986).
Adherence to the convertibility rules of the Bretton Woods system by the US and other
industrialized countries may possibly explain the stability of real output in that regime. Money
growth, but not the growth of real government spending, was less variable under Bretton Woods
than under the succeeding float (Bordo 1993b, Eichengreen 1993). Also demand (transitory)
shocks, presumably incorporating policy actions, were lowest under Bretton Woods (Bordo 1993a,
Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1994). According to Eichengreen (1993), the credibility of commitment
to the nominal anchor, as evidenced by a low degree of inflation persistence under Bretton Woods,
made inflationary expectations mean reverting. This produced a flatter short-run aggregate supply
curve than under the float where, in the absence of a nominal anchor, inflationary expectations
became extrapolative. Under these conditions, stabilization policy could be effective in stabilizing
output.
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That activist stabilization policy, both monetary and fiscal, was primarily responsible for the low
real output variability under Bretton Woods is doubtful. For the US, activist Keynesian policies
were a product of the late 1960s and 1970s and, for the other countries, the ongoing conflict
between internal and external balance dominated policy making. A more likely explanation for real
output stability is the absence of serious supply shocks.
42 In their 1960-1990 sample, Ghosh et al. (1996) find little connection between adherence to a pegged exchange rate
and growth, once account is taken of the 1960s experience. High-income floaters generally had more rapid growth than
low-income floaters. There was little correlation between output volatility and the regime.
43 For other arguments see Bordo and Schwartz (1999).
44 We do not consider the connection between unemployment and monetary and fiscal regimes for various reasons in
this paper. First, it is difficult to find data on unemployment for all countries for all periods. Second, we are of the
opinion that the long run patterns of unemployment rates are primarily due to the structural features of the labour
markets, not to regime performance per se.29
In summary, the gold standard and convertible Bretton Woods regime exhibited the most stability
of financial variables for the 14 countries. In addition, the Bretton Woods convertible regime
exhibited the best overall macroeconomic performance of any regime.
45 As the summary statistics
in the tables show, both nominal and real variables were most stable in this period. However, the
floating rate regime on most criteria, was not far behind the Bretton Woods convertible regime.
46
In sum, these results agree with the views of Axel Leijonhufvud (see Bordo and Jonung 1996) and
others that convertibility rules in the past have been associated with superior performance of
nominal variables. However, there is little evidence that adherence to convertibility rules has been
associated with better real performance as can be seen in a comparison between the recent float and
the gold standard.
5. Conclusions
This paper has surveyed the historical experience of monetary and fiscal regimes during the past
century for the developed economies of the world. Our sifting through the evidence suggests a
number of conclusions.
First, a salient theme in our survey is that the convertibility rule or 'convertibility principle',
whereby monetary authorities attach primary importance to specie convertibility, which dominated
both domestic and international aspects of the monetary and fiscal regime before World War I, has
since declined in importance, in particular after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. This
reflects in our opinion primarily the preferences of electorates and policymakers within major
nations to give more emphasis to short-run stabilization of the real economy through monetary and
fiscal measures.
Policy techniques and doctrine that developed under the pre-World War I convertible regime
proved to be inadequate to deal with domestic stabilization goals in the vastly changed environment
of the interwar period in which financial, economic and political institutions and relationships were
greatly transformed from that of the pre-1914 world. This transformation set the stage for the
decline of the old regime and the search for new monetary, financial and fiscal techniques to
stabilize economic behaviour.
45 We do not consider here the characteristics of the business cycle, such as the amplitude of cyclical fluctuations, under
different regimes. This is an open issue. Much suggests, however, that the cyclical fluctuations were not significantly
larger during the classical gold standard than during the post World War II period.
46 Our results differ from those of Baxter and Stockman (1989) who find little differences between macroeconomic
variables across regimes. The differences with our results reflect the use of different filters and econometric techniques.30
In the post-World War II era, the gradual abandonment of the convertibility principle, and its
eventual replacement by the goal of full employment in many countries, combined with the legacy
of inadequate policy tools and theory developed in the interwar period, paved the way for the Great
Inflation of the 1970s, following in the wake of the two oil price shocks. This is also reflected in the
large rise in public debt in the 1970s and in particular in the 1980s.
In the 1990s there has been an apparent shift back to the policy preferences and policy behaviour of
the pre-1914 period. Thus the concept of a nominal anchor has returned to prominence recently in
the form of inflation targeting adopted in several OECD-countries.
Second, the evidence suggests the existence of a close interaction between the monetary regime,
that is the behaviour of the central bank/monetary authorities, and the fiscal regime, that is the tax
and spending behaviour of governments, as reflected in the evolution of budget deficits and public
debt.
Prior to the 1970s a monetary regime based on the commitment to convertibility of the domestic
currency into specie, or to a foreign currency, was the prevailing pattern in the world economy.
Under this institutional arrangement, the monetary regime disciplined the fiscal regime that is the
monetary regime imposed binding constraints on fiscal policies. There was one major exception to
this rule where fiscal demands determined monetary policies, that was in the event of a major war
and its immediate aftermath.
The 'convertibility principle' was effectively abandoned in the 1960s before the Bretton Woods
system was formally terminated in the period 1971-73. Once the Bretton Woods arrangements were
abandoned, the constraints over stabilization policies were weakened and monetary policies in a
number of countries became subordinated to fiscal demands. After the breakdown of the Bretton
Woods system, monetary policies were used to stimulate aggregate demand to maintain full
employment. This in turn created inflationary pressure. At the same time debt financed fiscal
policies - although not having a direct inflationary impact - posed the threat of inflation, because of
the increased likelihood that monetary authorities would have to ultimately finance the deficits. In
the event of a debt default, an exorbitant risk premium would develop.
The return to the convertibility principle implies a return to a rule or rule-like behaviour in which
monetary policy is geared towards the goal of low inflation and the level of debt is to be kept
sufficiently low to avoid threatening monetary stability. In many ways the advent of inflation
targeting or ”price stability” as the primary goal of monetary policy has great similarities with the
gold standard period. However, there is an important difference. The monetary system is today
based on a managed fiat system - not on an automatic specie system. The anchor is thus a managed
not an automatic one.31
The establishment of the EMU and the creation of the single currency, the Euro, should properly be
regarded as a return to the convertibility principle. The European central bank (ECB) declared in
1998 price stability – a rate of inflation below two per cent per year over the medium term – as the
primary goal of its policy. The present twelve members of the Euro-area are committed to support
this goal by a policy of fiscal prudence. The fiscal policy process is co-ordinated through the
Stability and Growth Pact and other procedures to guarantee that the budgetary policy of any single
member or group of members is consistent with the overriding goal of price stability. In short, the
new European monetary regime is designed to dominate the fiscal regime in order to guarantee the
credibility and sustainability of the goal of price stability.
For the future our prediction is that if fiscal balance is achieved in most major economies, monetary
regimes based on either an internal commitment norm like price stability or an external commitment
to a foreign currency will prevail. Thus, a nominal anchor, similar to what was once embodied in
the specie convertibility principle will again keep monetary and fiscal policies in check.32
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DATA APPENDIX
Belgium
(1) Population. 1880-1988: Mitchell (1992). 1989-95: IFS,s e r i e s9 9 Z .
(3) Real national income growth. 1880-1920: Not available. 1921-39: GNP, E. Buyst (1997),
”New GNP Estimates for the Belgian Economy During the Interwar Period”, Review of Income and
Wealth, vol. 43, pp. 357-375, table 4. 1940-47: Not available. 1948: NNP, Mitchell (1992).
1949-53: GDP, Mitchell (1992), 1954-94: GDP, IFS, series 99B.P. 1995: OECD Economic
Outlook.
(3) Nominal national income. 1880-1912: Not available. 1913-1919: Constructed from CPI and
interpolated data on real NNP. 1920-39: GNP, Buyst (1997), table 4. 1940-46: Interpolated for
1940, 1942 and 1944-45. 1946-47: Chained NNP, Mitchell (1992). 1948-52: GDP, Mitchell
(1992), 1953-95: GDP, IFS, series 99B.
(4) Inflation. 1880-1948: CPI, Mitchell (1992), except 1914-20 and 1941-46: Not available.
1949-95: CPI, IFS, series 64.
(5) Nominal exchange rate. 1880-1914: Data supplied by Marc Flandreau. 1915-47: International
Monetary Fund. 1948-95: IFS,s e r i e sR F .
(6) Long term interest rate. 1880-1969: Yield of long-term Belgian Government Securities (3%
Rentes, 4% Unified Debt (No Maturity), 2,5% Rentes and Government Bond Average), Homer and
Sylla (1991), tables 30 and 66, except 1914-18: Not available. 1970-95: Government bond yield,
IFS, series 61.
(7) Money stock growth. 1880-1971: M1, Statistical Appendix in J. Delbeke (1988), Geld en
Bankkrediet in Belgie, 1877-1983, Klasse der Letteren, Jaargang 50, Nr. 129, Brussel: Koninklijke
Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van Belgie, table 1.2, column 7 and
table 1.3, column 9, except 1914-19 and 1941-46: Not available. 1972-95: Money, IFS, series 34.
(8) Monetary base growth. 1880-1950: Bank note circulation, central bank issues, Mitchell (1992).
1951-95: Reserve money, IFS, series 14.
(9) Central government expenditures and revenues. 1880-1969: Mitchell (1978), except 1913-19
and 1940: not available. 1970-94: IFS, series 82 and 81. (Note: Change of definition in 1970.)
(10) Central government debt. 1880-1939: Data supplied by Erik Buyst at the Katholieke
Universiteit in Leuven, except 1915-1918: Not available. 1948-1994: IFS, series 88A + 89A.
Canada
(1) Population. 1880-1955: M. C. Urquhart and K. A. H. Buckley (1965), Historical Statistics of
Canada, Montreal: MacMillan. 1956-95: IFS,s e r i e s9 9 Z .
(2) Real national income growth. 1880-1926: GNP, M. C. Urquhart (1986), ”New Estimates of
Gross National Product, Canada, 1870-1926: Some Implications for Canadian Development” in S.
L. Engerman and R. E. Gallman (eds.), Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth, pp. 9-
94, Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 51, NBER, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, table
2.9. 1927-48: GNP, Mitchell (1993). 1949-95: GDP, IFS, series 99B.R.
(3) Nominal national income. 1880-1925: GNP, Urquhart (1986), table 2.9. 1926-47: GNP,
Mitchell (1993). 1948-95: GDP, IFS, series 99B.C.
(4) Inflation. 1880-1914: Interurban-Intertemporal CPI, R. C. Allen (1990), Real Income in the
English Speaking World, University of British Columbia Press. 1915-48: CPI, Urquhart and
Buckley (1965). 1949-95: CPI, IFS, series 64.37
(5) Nominal exchange rate. 1880-1914: Gold standard, rate = unity. 1915-47: Federal Reserve
Board (1943 and 1976), Banking and Monetary Statistics 1 and 2. 1948-95: IFS,s e r i e sR F .
(6) Long term interest rate. 1880-1919: Government of Canada long-term bond yield, E. P.
Neufield (1972), The Financial System of Canada, Toronto: MacMillan, table 15.2, except
1914-18: M. D. Bordo and L. Jonung (1987), The Long-Run Behavior of the Velocity of
Circulation, The International Evidence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.
160).1920-79: Dominion of Canada, long-term bond yield, Homer and Sylla (1991), table 75.
1980-95: Government bond yield, long-term, IFS, series 61.
(7) Money stock growth. 1880-1948: M2, definition and sources are given in Bordo and Jonung
(1987), pp. 155-154. 1949-95: Money plus quasi-money, IFS,s e r i e s3 5 L .
(8) Monetary base growth. 1880-1948: Currency in circulation, Mitchell (1993). 1949-95: Reserve
money, IFS, series 14.
(9) Central government expenditures and revenues. 1880-1947: Mitchell (1993). 1948-94:
IFS, series 82 and 81.
(10) Central government debt. 1880-99: F. H. Leacy, M. C. Urquhart and K. A. H. Buckley (1983),
Historical Statistics of Canada, Second Edition, Ottawa: Statistics Canada, series H37 and H38.
1900-95: Statistics Canada, CANSIM matrix 3199.
Denmark
(1) Population. 1880-1988: Mitchell (1992). 1989-95: IFS,s e r i e s9 9 Z .
(2) Real national income growth. 1880-1950: GDP, Mitchell (1992). 1951-95: GDP, IFS,s e r i e s
99B.P.
(3) Nominal national income. 1880-1949: GDP, Mitchell (1992). 1950-95: GDP, IFS,s e r i e s9 9 B .
(4) Inflation. 1880-1949: CPI, Mitchell (1992). 1950-95: CPI, IFS, series 64.
(5) Nominal exchange rate. 1880-1883: Not available. 1884-47: Annual Report of the Bank of
Denmark (various issues). 1948-95: IFS,s e r i e sR F .
(6) Long term interest rate. 1880-1947: Rate of interest on consols (yearly average), Danmarks
statistik (1969), Kreditmarkedsstatistik. 1948-95: Government bond yield, IFS, series 61.
(7) Money stock growth. 1880-1971: Borgernes Likviditet (M2), N. Kjærgård (1991), Økonomisk
vækst: En økonometrisk analyse af Danmark 1870-1981, Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonom-
forbundets Forlag, pp. 582-83, table 3, series AM. 1972-95: Money plus quasi-money, IFS,s e r i e s
35L.
(8) Monetary base growth. 1880-1948: Bank note circulation, central bank issues, Mitchell (1992),
except 1892: Not available. 1949-95: Reserve money, IFS, series 14.
(9) Central government expenditures and revenues. 1880-1947: Mitchell (1992). 1948-95: IFS,
series 82 and 81.
(10) Central government debt. 1880-1978: H. C. Johansen (1985), Dansk økonomisk statistik 1814-
1980, i H. P. Clausen, S. Ellehöj and S. Mörch (1985) Danmarks historie, Bind 9, Copenhagen:
Gyldendal. 1979-1995: Danmarks statistik, Statistisk årsbog (various issues).38
Finland
(1) Population. 1880-1988: Mitchell (1992). 1989-95: IFS,s e r i e s9 9 Z .
(2) Real national income growth. 1880-1980: GDP, Statistical Appendix in R. Hjerppe (1989), The
Finnish Economy 1860-1985, Growth and Structural Change, Bank of Finland, Helsinki:
Government Printing Centre, table 1. 1981-95: GDP, IFS, series 99B.P.
(3) Nominal national income. 1880-1979: GDP, Hjerppe (1989), table 2A. 1980-95: GDP, IFS,
series 99b.
(4) Inflation. 1880-1980: Cost-of-living index, Hjerppe (1989), table 13. 1981-95: CPI, IFS,s e r i e s
64.
(5) Nominal exchange rate. 1880-1910: Not available. 1911-47: Derived from Sveriges riksbank,
Riksbankens årsbok (various issues), (Annual Report of the Bank of Sweden). 1948-95: IFS,s e r i e s
RF.
(6) Long term interest rate. 1880-1960: Not available. 1961-95: Non-central government taxable
public bond yield (from 1994, taxable 5-year central government bond yield), OECD Economic
Outlook,s e r i e sI R L .
(7) Money stock growth. 1880-1971: M2, T. Haavisto (1992), Money and Economic Activity in
Finland 1866-1985, Ph.D. thesis, Lund Economic Studies number 48, Lund University, average of
end-of-month figures in table 4A.2. 1972-95: Money plus quasi-money, IFS,s e r i e s3 5 L .
(8) Monetary base growth. 1880-1948: Bank note circulation, central bank issues, Mitchell (1992).
1949-95: Reserve money, IFS, series 14.
(9) Central government expenditures and revenues. 1880-81: Not available. 1882-1948: Mitchell
(1992). 1949-94: IFS, series 82 and 81.
(10) Central government debt. 1880-1974: R. Hjerppe (1996), Finland's Historical National
Accounts 1860-1994: Calculation Methods and Statistical Tables, Jyväskylä. 1975-1995: Statistics
Finland, Statistisk årsbok (various issues).
France
(1) Population. 1880-1949: Mitchell (1978). 1950-95 IFS,s e r i e s9 9 Z .
(2) Real national income growth. 1880-1950: GDP, Mitchell (1992), except 1914-20 and 1939-50:
GDP, A. Maddison (1995), Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992, OECD, table C-16a.
1951-95: GDP, IFS, series 99B.R.
(3) Nominal national income. 1880-1948: GDP, Mitchell (1992), except 1914-19 and 1939-48:
Constructed from data on real GDP and CPI. 1949: GNP, Mitchell (1992). 1950-95: GDP, IFS,
series 99B.C.
(4) Inflation. 1880-1949: CPI, Mitchell (1992). 1950-95: CPI, IFS, series 64.
(5) Nominal exchange rate. 1880-1947: M. Saint-Marc (1983), Histoire Monétaire de la France
1880-1980, Paris: Presses Universitaires de la France. 1948-95: IFS,s e r i e sR F .
(6) Long term interest rate. 1880-1947: Yield of long-term French government securities (3%
Rentes), Homer and Sylla (1991), tables 25 and 62. 1948-95: Government bond yield, IFS,s e r i e s
61.
(7) Money stock growth. 1880-1897: M1, Saint-Marc (1983). 1898-1977: M2, J.-P. Patat and M.
Lutfalla (1990), A Monetary History of France in the Twentieth Century, London: Macmillan,
tables 1.4, A2, A3 and A5. 1978-95: M2, IFS, series 38NB.
(8) Monetary base growth. 1880-1948: Bank note circulation, central bank issues, Mitchell (1992).
1949-95: Reserve money, IFS, series 14.
(9) Central government expenditures and revenues. 1880-1949: Mitchell (1992). 1950-95: IFS,
series 82 and 81.39
(10) Central government debt. 1880-1889: Data supplied by M. Flandreau. 1890-1939: P. Villa
(1994), A Century of Macroeconomic Data. 1940-1950: Not available. 1951-1994: IFS,s e r i e s8 8 B
+ 89B.
Germany
(1) Population. 1880-1979: Appendix 2 in A. Sommariva and G. Tullio (1987), German
Macroeconomic History 1880-1979, London: MacMillan Press, pp. 234-236. 1980-95: IFS,s e r i e s
99Z.
(2) Real national income growth. 1880-1979: NNP, Sommariva and Tullio (1987), pp. 226-228.
1980-95: GDP, IFS, series 99B.R. (Unified Germany from 1991.)
(3) Nominal national income. 1880-1949: NNP, Mitchell (1992), except 1914-24 and 1939-49:
Constructed from data on real NNP and CPI. 1950-95: GDP, IFS, series 99B.C. (Unified Germany
from 1991.)
(4) Inflation. 1880-1949: CPI, Sommariva and Tullio (1987), pp. 231-234. 1950-95: CPI, IFS,
series 64.
(5) Nominal exchange rate. 1880-1947: Sommariva and Tulio (1987), pp. 231-234. 1948-95: IFS,
series RF.
(6) Long term interest rate. 1880-1975: High grade bond yield, S. Homer and R. Sylla (1991), A
History of Interest Rates, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, tables 32 and 68, except
1922-23, 1944-47 and 1954-55: Not available. 1976-95: Mortgage bond yield, IFS, series 61A.
(7) Money stock growth. 1880-1913: M2, Data underlying M. D. Bordo (1986), ”Financial Crises,
Banking Crises, Stock Market Crashes and the Money Supply: Some International Evidence” in F.
Capie and G. Wood (eds.), Financial Crises and the World Banking System, London: Macmillan.
1914-25: Not available. 1926-38: M2, Deutsche Bundesbank (1976), Deutsches Geld und
Bankwesen in Zahlen 1876-1975, Frankfurt am Main: Fritz Knapp Gmbh, pp. 14 and 18. 1939-49:
Not available. 1950-71: M2, Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly reports (various issues). 1972-95:
Money plus quasi-money, IFS,s e r i e s3 5 L .
(8) Monetary base growth. 1880-1950: Bank note circulation, total issues, Mitchell (1992), except
1945-48: Not available. 1951-95: Reserve money, IFS, series 14.
(9) Central government expenditures and revenues. 1880-1951: Mitchell (1978), except 1922-23
and 1935-49: Not available. 1952-95: IFS, series 82 and 81. Note: Change of definition in 1970.
(10) Central government debt. 1880-1945: Deutsche Bundesbank (ed.) (1988), 40 Jahre Deutsche
Mark. Monetär Statistiken 1948-1987, Frankfurt am Main: Fritz Knapp. 1946-1949: Not available.
1950-1994: IFS, series 88.
Italy
(1) Population. 1880-1975: Instituto centrale di statistica (1976), Sommario di Statistiche Storiche
dell’Italia 1861-1975, Rom. 1976-95: IFS, series 99Z.
(2) Real national income growth. 1880-1951: GNP, Mitchell (1992). 1952-60: GDP, Mitchell
(1992). 1961-67: GDP, IFS, series 99B.R. 1968-95: GDP, IMF (1997), International Financial
Statistics Yearbook 1997, Washington D.C., series 99B.R.
(3) Nominal national income. 1880-1950: GNP, Mitchell (1992). 1951-82: GDP, IFS,s e r i e s
99B.C. 1983-95: GDP, IMF (1997), series 99B.C.
(4) Inflation. 1880-1948: CPI, Statistical Appendix in M. Fratianni and F. Spinelli (1991), Storia
Monetaria d’Italia, Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, pp. 66-71, series CLI. 1949-95: CPI, IFS,
series 64.40
(5) Nominal exchange rate. 1880-1947: Fratianni and Spinelli (1991), pp. 87-89, series ELUS.
1948-95: IFS,s e r i e sR F .
(6) Long term interest rate. 1880-1979: Fratianni and Spinelli (1991), pp. 82-84, series RIL.
1980-95: Government bond yield, Medium-Term, IFS, series 61.
(7) Money stock growth. 1880-1980: M3, Fratianni and Spinelli (1991), pp. 48-51, series
U1+U2+D. 1981-95: M2, IMF (1997), series 38N.
(8) Monetary base growth. 1880-1955: Bank note circulation, total issues, Mitchell (1992).
1956-71: Reserve money, IFS, series 14. 1972-95: Reserve money, IMF (1997), series 14.
(9) Central government expenditures and revenues. 1880-1949: Mitchell (1992). 1950-91: IFS,
series 82 and 81.
(10) Central government debt. 1880-1947: Fratianni and Spinelli (1991). 1948-1995: IFS,s e r i e s
88.
Japan
(1) Population. 1880-1949: Bureau of Statistics (1957), Japan Statistical Yearbook. 1950-95 IFS,
series 99Z.
(2) Real national income growth. 1880-84: Not available. 1885-1929: GNP, B. R. Mitchell (1991),
International Historical Statistics: Asia, New York: Stockton Press. 1930-56: GDP, Mitchell
(1991), except 1945 and 1952: GDP, Maddison (1995), table C-16a. 1957-95: GDP, IFS,s e r i e s
99B.R.
(3) Nominal national income. 1880-84: Not available. 1885-1929: GNP, Mitchell (1991).
1930-55: GDP, Mitchell (1991), except 1945: Constructed from data on real GDP and CPI.
1956-95: GDP, IFS, series 99B.C.
(4) Inflation. 1880-1922: WPI, Mitchell (1991). 1923-48: CPI, Mitchell (1991). 1949-95: CPI,
IFS, series 64.
(5) Nominal exchange rate. 1880-1947: Data supplied by James Lothian. 1948-95: IFS,s e r i e sR F .
(6) Long term interest rate. 1880-1965: Not available. 1966-95: Government bond yield, IFS,
series 61.
(7) Money stock growth. 1880-1971: M1, data supplied by the Bank of Japan. 1972-95: Money,
IFS,s e r i e s3 4 B .
(8) Monetary base growth. 1880-1953: Bank note circulation, Mitchell (1991). 1954-95: Reserve
money, IFS, series 14.
(9) Central government expenditures and revenues. 1880-1954: Mitchell (1991). 1955-93: IFS,
series 82 and 81. (Note: Changes of definitions in 1955 and 1976.)
(10) Central government debt. 1880-1970: Calculated from K. Ohkawa and M. Shinohara (1979),
Patterns of Japanese Economic Development, A Quantitative Appraisal, New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, Table A46, pp. 376-378. 1971-1974: Not available. 1975-1990: IFS,s e r i e s
88a + 89a.41
Netherlands
(1) Population. 1880-1988: Mitchell (1992). 1989-95: IFS,s e r i e s9 9 Z .
(2) Real national income growth. 1880-1960: GDP, A. Maddison (1995), Monitoring the World
Economy 1820-1992, OECD, table C-16a. 1961-95: GDP, IFS, series 99B.R.
(3) Nominal national income. 1880-1899: Not available. 1900-1947: NNP, Mitchell (1992).
1948-49: GDP, Mitchell (1992). 1950-95: GDP, IFS, series 99B.C.
(4) Inflation. 1880-1949: CPI, Mitchell (1992). 1950-95: CPI, IFS, series 64.
(5) Nominal exchange rate. 1880-1912: Not available. 1913-14: Data supplied by Marc Flandreau.
1915-47: International Monetary Fund. 1948-95: IFS,s e r i e sR F .
(6) Long term interest rate. 1880-1969: 2.5% Perpetual Debt of the Central Government, Homer
and Sylla (1991), tables 28 and 64. 1970-95: Government bond yield, IFS, series 61.
(7) Money stock growth. 1880-1900: Currency, data supplied by Mr W. F. Vanthoor at De
Nederlandsche Bank. 1901-71: M2, Central Bureau voor de Statistiek (1976), 75 Jaar Statistiek
van Nederland. 1972-95: Money, IFS, series 34.
(8) Monetary base growth. 1880-1948: Bank note circulation, total issues, Mitchell (1992).
1949-95: Reserve money, IFS, series 14.
(9) Central government expenditures and revenues. 1880-1899: Not available. 1900-1948:
Mitchell (1992). 1949-95: IFS, series 82 and 81. Note: change of definition in 1973.
(10) Central government debt. 1880-1899: Not available. 1900-1957: Central Bureau voor de
Statistiek (1959), Zestig jaar statistiek in tijdreeksen, Voorburg. 1958-1986: Central Bureau voor
de Statistiek (1994), Vijfennegentig jaar statistiek in tijdreeksen, Voorburg. 1987-95: IFS,s e r i e s
88A + 89A.
Norway
(1) Population. 1880-1988: Mitchell (1992). 1989-95: IFS,s e r i e s9 9 Z .
(2) Real national income growth. 1880-1949: GDP, Mitchell (1992), except 1940-46: Data
supplied by J. T. Klovland. 1950-95: GDP, IFS, series 99B.P.
(3) Nominal national income. 1880-1948: GDP, Mitchell (1992), except 1940-45: Constructed
from data on real GDP and CPI. 1949-95: GDP, IFS, series 99B. (Note: Change in definition
1987.)
(4) Inflation. 1880-1948: CPI, Statistisk sentralbyrå (1994), Historisk statistikk 1994,O s l o .
1949-95: CPI, IFS, series 64.
(5) Nominal exchange rate. 1880-1898: Not available. 1899-1947: Annual Report of the Bank of
Norway (various issues). 1948-95: IFS,s e r i e sR F .
(6) Long term interest rate. 1880-1975: Long-term bond yield (15 years), J. T. Klovland (1976),
”Obligationsrenten i Norge 1852-1976”, Statsøkonomisk Tidskrift, vol. 90. 1976-95: Government
bond yield, IFS, series 61.
(7) Money stock growth. 1880-1971: M2, J. T. Klovland (1978), Quantitative Studies in the
Monetary History of Norway, Ph.D. thesis, Bergen: Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration. 1972-95: Broad money (M2), IFS, series 38N.
(8) Monetary base growth. 1880-1948: Bank note circulation, central bank issues, Mitchell (1992),
except 1940-45: Not available. 1949-95: Reserve money, IFS, series 14.
(9) Central government expenditures and revenues. 1880-1953: Mitchell (1992). 1954-94: IFS,
series 82 and 81.
(10) Central government debt. 1880-1992: Statistisk sentralbyrå (1994). (Note: Change of
definition in 1972.)42
Sweden
(1) Population. 1880-1988: Mitchell (1992). 1989-95: IFS,s e r i e s9 9 Z .
(2) Real national income growth. 1880-1950: GDP, O. Krantz and C-A. Nilsson (1975), Swedish
National Product 1861-1970: New Aspects on Methods and Measurements, Lund: C.W.K.
Glerup/Liber Läromedel, table 3.1 and table 1:2, columns 2 + 4 (GDP at factor cost plus indirect
taxes and customs duties deflated by the implicit GDP-deflator at factor cost). 1951-95: GDP,
Statistics Sweden (1996), Statistiska Meddelanden SM 9601 N10,t a b l e1 .
(3) Nominal national income. 1880-1949: GDP, Krantz and Nilsson (1975), table 1:2, columns 2 +
4 (GDP at factor cost plus indirect taxes and customs duties). 1950-95: GDP, Statistics Sweden
(1996), table 1.
(4) Inflation. 1880-1948: CPI, Statistiska Centralbyrån (1996), Statistiska Meddelanden P15
SM9501, p. 22. 1949-95: CPI, IFS, series 64.
(5) Nominal exchange rate. 1880-1947: Sveriges riksbank, Riksbankens årsbok (various issues),
(Annual Report of the Bank of Sweden). 1948-95: IFS,s e r i e sR F .
(6) Long term interest rate. 1880-1921: Effective average return on the total government debt, data
supplied by SAF. 1922-47: Market yield on long-term government bonds, Homer and Sylla (1991),
table 72. 1948-95: Government bond yield, IFS, series 61.
(7) Money stock growth. 1880-1971: Money stock (M2), L. Jonung (1975), Studies in the Monetary
History of Sweden, Ph.D. thesis, Los Angeles: UCLA, Appendix A, table A-1, column (5).
1972-95: Broad money (M3), IFS, series 38N.
(8) Monetary base growth. 1880-1948: Bank note circulation, central bank issues, Mitchell (1992).
1949-95: Reserve money, IFS, series 14.
(9) Central government expenditures and revenues. 1880: Not available.1881-1947: Mitchell
(1992). 1948-95: IFS, series 82 and 81. (Note: Change of definition in 1966.)
(10) Central government debt. 1880-1995: Riksgäldskontorets årsbok (various issues).
Switzerland
(1) Population. 1880-1988: Mitchell (1992). 1989-95: IFS,s e r i e s9 9 Z .
(2) Real national income growth. 1880-1913: GDP, H. Ritzmann-Blickensdorfer (ed.) (1996),
Historical Statistics of Switzerland, Zürich: Chronos-Verlag, henceforth Historical Statistics (1996),
table Q.1a. 1914-29: Not available. 1930-48: NNP, Mitchell (1992), . 1949-95: GDP, IFS,s e r i e s
99B.R.
(3) Nominal national income. 1880-1913: GDP, Historical Statistics (1996), table Q.1a. 1914-28:
Constructed from CPI and interpolated data on real GDP. 1929-47: Chained NNP, Mitchell (1992).
1948-95: GDP, IFS, series 99B.C.
(4) Inflation. 1880-90: CPI, Historical Statistics (1996), table Q.1a. 1891-1980: CPI, Federal
Office of Statistics (1990), Statistical Year Book of Switzerland, Berne, table T 5.7. 1981-95: CPI,
IFS, series 64.
(5) Nominal exchange rate. 1880-1912: Not available. 1913-14: Data supplied by Marc Flandreau.
1915-47: International Monetary Fund. 1948-95: IFS,s e r i e sR F .
(6) Long term interest rate. 1880-1916: Mortgage bond yield (Taux d’intérêt pour obligations de
caisse), Historical Statistics (1996), tables O.18b and O.18c. 1917-47: Government bond yield
(Rendement d’obligation de la confederation), Historical Statistics (1996), table O.18c. 1948-95:
Government bond yield, IFS, series 61.
(7) Money stock growth. 1880-1907: M1, Historical Statistics (1996), table O.3. 1908-1948: M3,
Historical Statistics (1996), table O.4. 1949-95: Money plus quasi-money, IFS,s e r i e s3 5 L .43
(8) Monetary base growth. 1880-1948: Bank note circulation, total issues, Mitchell (1992).
1949-95: Reserve money, IFS, series 14.
(9) Central government expenditures and revenues. 1880-1947: Mitchell (1992). 1948-95: IFS,
series 82 and 81.
(10) Central government debt. 1880-1912: Not available. 1913-1971: Historical Statistics (1996),
table U.5. 1938-1959: Not available. 1972-1995: IFS, series 88. (Note: Change of definition in
1972.)
United Kingdom
(1) Population. 1880-1965: C. Feinstein (1972), National Income, Expenditure and Output of the
United Kingdom 1855-1965, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, table 1, column 13.
1966-95: IFS,s e r i e s9 9 Z .
(2) Real national income growth. 1880-1948 GDP, B. R. Mitchell (1988), British Historical
Statistics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 831-835. 1949-95: GDP, IFS, series 99B.R.
(3) Nominal national income. 1880-1947: GDP, Mitchell (1988), pp. 837-841. 1948-95: GDP, IFS,
series 99B.C.
(4) Inflation. 1880-1948: Feinstein’s retail price series, F. Capie and A. Webber (1985), A
Monetary History of the United Kingdom, Volume 1, London: George Allen and Unwin, table III,
column 12. 1949-95: CPI, IFS, series 64.
(5) Nominal exchange rate. 1880-1947: M. Friedman and A. J. Schwartz (1982), Monetary Trends
in the United States and the United Kingdom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1948-95: IFS,
series RF.
(6) Long term interest rate. 1880-1966: Rate of interest on consols (3%), D. K. Sheppard (1971),
The Growth and Role of U.K. Financial Institutions, 1880-1967, London: Methuen and Co., table
A.3.7, column II. 1967-95: Government bond yield, long-term, IFS, series 61.
(7) Money stock growth. 1880-1966: Net money Supply (M2), Sheppard (1986), table A.3.3,
column 6. 1967-95: Money plus quasi-money, IFS,s e r i e s3 5 L .
(8) Monetary base growth. 1880-1948: Bank note circulation, central bank issues, Mitchell (1992).
1949-95: Reserve money, IFS, series 14.
(9) Central government expenditures and revenues. 1880-1947: Mitchell (1992). 1948-95:
IFS, series 82 and 81.
(10) Central government debt. 1880-1939: B.R. Mitchell with the collaboration of P. Deane (1962),
Abstract of British Historical Statistics, London: Cambridge University Press, pp. 401-403.
1940-1995: Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics (various issues), London.44
United States
(1) Population. 1880-1957: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1975),
Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Washington D.C., henceforth
Historical Statistics (1975), series A6. 1958-95: International Financial Statistics on CD-ROM,
henceforth IFS, series 99Z.
(2) Real national income growth. 1880-1948 GNP, N. S. Balke and R. J. Gordon (1986), Appendix
B, Historical data in R. J. Gordon (ed.), The American Business Cycle, Continuity and Change,
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 781-783. 1949-95: GDP, IFS, series 99B.R.
(3) Nominal national income. 1880-1947: GNP, Balke and Gordon (1986), pp. 781-783. 1948-95:
GDP, IFS, series 99B.C.
(4) Inflation. 1880-1948: CPI, Historical Statistics (1975), series E135. 1949-95: CPI, IFS,s e r i e s
64.
(5) Nominal exchange rate. 1880-1995: Unity by definition.
(6) Long term interest rate. 1880-1979: Basic yield on corporate bonds with 10 years to maturity,
extension of Macauley’s railroad bond rate, data supplied by NBER. 1980-95: Government bond
yield, long-term, IFS, series 61.
(7) Money stock growth. 1880-1971: M2, Balke and Gordon (1986), pp.784-786. 1972-95: Money
plus quasi-money, IFS,s e r i e s3 5 L .
(8) Monetary base growth. 1880-1948: Notes in circulation, B. R. Mitchell (1993), International
Historical Statistics: The Americas, 1750-1988, New York: Stockton Press. 1949-95: Reserve
money, IFS, series 14.
(9) Central government expenditures and revenues. 1880-1958: Mitchell (1993). 1959-95:
IFS, series 82 and 81.
(10) Central government debt. 1880-1970: Historical Statistics (1975), series Y493. 1971-1995:
US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1996), Statistical Abstract of the United
States, 116th edition, Washington D.C.45
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics on the Rate of Monetary Base Growth under Different Monetary Regimes.
14 Countries, 1881-1995. Annual Data: Mean and Standard Deviation.
Gold Standard WW I Interwar WW II Bretton Woods Floating Exchange Postwar
(Total) (Preconvertible) (Convertible) (Total) (High Inflation) (Low Inflation)
(1881-1913) (1914-1919) (1920-1938) (1939-1946) (1947-1971) (1947-1958) (1959-1971) (1973-1995) (1973-1982) (1983-1995) (1947-1995)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
USA 4,2 5,2 8,2 8,0 2,3 7,9 21,5 11,8 2,5 7,1 0,4 9,4 4,4 3,1 7,2 2,8 7,0 2,2 7,4 3,2 4,7 5,8
UK 0,2 2,0 41,2 21,8 1,0 4,8 13,9 6,6 3,6 4,2 2,6 4,1 4,5 4,2 7,9 9,6 9,6 9,7 6,5 9,7 5,9 7,8
Germany 3,0 3,9 62,3 24,9 6,8 14,9 35,0 11,9 9,9 5,5 11,5 3,2 8,6 6,6 5,3 5,0 4,6 5,5 5,8 4,8 8,0 6,3
France 2,8 3,4 36,0 16,2 6,0 6,5 31,1 7,8 10,4 7,0 13,4 8,0 7,6 4,6 4,4 9,5 7,2 11,0 2,3 8,0 8,0 9,3
Japan 3,4 8,8 27,2 21,6 2,6 8,5 64,0 59,0 20,6 25,9 24,5 37,4 17,0 5,4 8,2 7,4 10,9 9,3 6,1 4,9 14,9 20,1
Canada 4,8 7,8 12,3 10,1 -0,2 6,9 21,6 12,6 5,1 3,7 3,9 3,4 6,3 3,6 6,5 5,1 10,4 4,6 3,6 3,1 6,0 4,6
Italy 1,6 4,3 38,0 13,1 1,9 17,0 52,3 36,3 15,3 17,7 16,8 18,1 13,9 17,9 12,0 10,5 19,2 8,3 6,4 8,5 13,7 14,5
Belgium 3,6 2,7 38,6 63,1 8,7 9,4 33,9 24,0 4,2 3,0 4,2 3,4 4,1 2,7 3,2 4,2 5,6 3,6 1,4 3,8 3,9 3,9
Netherlands 1,5 3,8 22,9 16,8 -0,2 7,1 41,4 27,9 5,4 4,4 4,9 5,6 5,7 3,1 6,9 8,5 7,7 2,9 6,3 11,2 6,2 6,6
Switzerland 4,1 9,7 23,1 17,8 3,4 12,9 11,3 5,1 6,5 5,1 4,1 3,8 8,6 5,3 1,4 6,9 3,4 6,8 -0,1 6,9 4,1 6,5
Sweden 6,0 10,0 22,7 19,1 2,1 7,5 13,6 9,7 5,8 4,2 5,5 5,8 6,1 2,3 12,0 15,0 12,4 14,3 11,6 16,2 8,8 11,1
Denmark 2,4 4,1 22,1 12,8 -0,3 7,5 22,1 12,0 4,6 8,9 2,6 9,7 6,3 8,1 13,6 35,1 7,5 12,9 18,2 45,6 8,8 25,0
Finland 3,1 10,4 50,1 35,3 4,0 10,8 38,1 24,1 8,2 7,0 9,9 7,6 6,6 6,3 17,5 19,1 18,2 18,0 16,9 20,6 12,7 14,6
Norway 3,3 5,3 27,9 16,7 0,6 8,2 5,1 6,4 4,1 8,9 6,1 2,6 7,2 5,4 9,9 5,0 5,2 5,0 6,1 5,9
G7 mean 2,5 4,4 28,2 14,5 2,5 8,3 29,9 18,3 8,4 8,9 9,1 10,5 7,8 5,7 6,4 6,2 8,6 6,3 4,8 5,3 7,7 8,5
G7 converg. 1,7 2,9 20,5 8,4 2,6 5,4 20,6 19,5 7,0 8,6 8,9 12,2 5,5 5,3 3,4 3,7 5,6 3,9 2,6 3,3 4,8 6,2
Total mean 2,9 5,4 28,8 19,8 2,6 8,7 28,5 17,8 7,1 7,3 7,2 8,6 7,1 5,1 7,6 9,6 8,9 7,6 6,5 10,1 7,5 9,5
Total converg. 1,6 3,2 16,1 14,4 2,8 4,1 17,2 15,5 5,2 6,4 6,8 9,0 4,0 4,1 4,7 8,5 5,1 5,0 5,4 11,2 4,0 6,6
Note: Banknote circulation 1881-1948, M0 1949-1995. Germany excluded 1920-24. Denmark, France and Netherlands excluded 1945. Belgium excluded
1944.
Convergence is defined as the standard deviation of each country's summary statistic around the grand mean of the group of countries.
Data Sources: See Data Appendix.52
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics on the Rate of Money Stock Growth under Different Monetary Regimes.
14 Countries, 1881-1995. Annual Data: Mean and Standard Deviation.
Gold Standard WW I Interwar WW II Bretton Woods Floating Exchange Postwar
(Total) (Preconvertible) (Convertible) (Total) (High Inflation) (Low Inflation)
(1881-1913) (1914-1919) (1920-1938) (1939-1946) (1947-1971) (1947-1958) (1959-1971) (1973-1995) (1973-1982) (1983-1995) (1947-1995)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
USA 6,5 5,0 12,2 5,5 2,3 8,3 15,2 6,1 5,2 2,8 3,2 1,8 7,1 2,1 7,4 3,8 9,7 2,5 5,6 3,7 6,4 3,5
UK 2,2 2,0 15,4 4,0 1,1 4,4 12,0 3,9 4,0 4,9 2,0 5,4 5,8 3,8 13,3 6,3 15,3 6,6 11,8 6,0 8,9 7,8
Germany 5,7 4,9 4,5 10,3 14,8 6,7 19,1 6,8 11,8 4,9 7,4 3,4 7,6 2,6 7,2 4,0 10,9 6,4
France 2,7 3,9 27,6 13,6 6,4 9,1 27,2 10,3 14,8 5,5 16,0 7,1 13,7 3,5 8,7 6,5 14,4 3,6 4,4 4,4 12,0 6,7
Japan 6,3 15,9 25,6 15,7 2,9 10,5 59,0 45,8 23,2 23,3 29,0 32,4 17,8 7,6 7,3 4,8 9,1 5,5 5,9 3,7 15,8 18,6
Canada 7,5 5,7 10,4 6,5 1,5 4,7 12,8 4,6 7,1 4,1 5,5 3,1 8,6 4,5 11,3 6,0 16,0 5,3 7,6 3,5 9,2 5,5
Italy 3,3 3,2 26,7 13,3 4,6 6,6 38,8 16,2 16,6 9,7 19,8 13,4 13,6 2,3 12,8 6,8 18,0 6,5 8,5 3,1 14,9 8,5
Belgium 3,1 5,2 6,5 11,3 4,7 3,5 3,1 3,7 6,1 2,9 5,3 3,8 5,9 4,3 4,9 3,5 5,2 3,8
Netherlands 1,8 3,5 27,5 12,6 0,0 8,1 22,7 39,0 6,2 5,2 3,5 6,0 8,7 2,8 7,3 5,0 7,7 6,8 7,0 3,1 6,9 5,3
Switzerland 4,2 4,2 10,8 4,2 3,2 4,7 6,1 2,8 7,6 3,4 4,9 1,8 10,1 2,3 5,9 5,7 6,4 7,8 5,5 3,6 6,8 4,6
Sweden 5,7 3,8 20,7 11,7 -0,3 4,9 8,3 4,3 7,6 3,7 6,5 3,3 8,5 4,0 8,0 4,9 11,5 4,0 5,3 3,8 7,9 4,3
Denmark 4,9 4,7 21,6 13,0 -0,7 4,5 11,8 7,5 7,0 4,7 3,9 3,7 9,9 3,6 10,1 8,4 12,0 5,6 8,6 10,0 8,6 6,8
Finland 7,2 6,6 33,8 23,0 5,7 6,4 21,3 10,2 12,0 4,8 12,7 6,2 11,3 3,3 11,8 6,6 15,4 3,6 9,0 7,1 12,0 5,7
Norway 5,1 3,1 27,3 20,3 -1,9 5,4 13,8 11,6 6,7 3,6 5,0 2,7 8,4 3,7 10,6 4,7 13,0 2,4 8,7 5,2 8,6 4,5
G7 mean 4,9 5,8 19,7 9,8 3,3 7,7 27,5 14,5 12,2 8,2 13,5 10,0 11,2 4,1 9,7 5,4 12,9 4,7 7,3 4,1 11,2 8,1
G7 convergence 2,1 4,6 7,9 5,0 1,9 2,5 18,6 16,0 7,0 7,0 10,2 10,6 4,2 1,9 2,7 1,4 4,0 1,7 2,4 0,9 3,4 4,9
Total mean 4,7 5,1 21,6 11,9 2,6 7,1 20,8 13,5 9,8 6,2 9,6 6,9 10,1 3,7 9,1 5,5 11,6 4,8 7,1 4,6 9,6 6,6
Total converg. 1,9 3,3 7,8 6,1 2,7 2,5 15,1 14,1 5,6 5,2 8,3 7,9 3,3 1,4 2,6 1,4 3,9 1,8 2,1 1,9 3,2 3,8
Note: Germany excluded 1920-25 (missing data).
Convergence is defined as the standard deviation of each country's summary statistic around the grand mean of the group of countries.
Data Sources: See Data Appendix.53
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics on the Central Government Expenditures as a Percentage of National Income under Different Monetary Regimes.
14 Countries, 1881-1995. Annual Data: Mean and Standard Deviation.
Gold Standard WW I Interwar WW II Bretton Woods Floating Exchange Postwar
(Total) (Preconvertible) (Convertible) (Total) (High Inflation) (Low Inflation)
(1881-1913) (1914-1919) (1920-1938) (1939-1946) (1947-1971) (1947-1958) (1959-1971) (1973-1995) (1973-1982) (1983-1995) (1947-1995)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
USA 2,3 0,3 7,8 9,0 5,9 2,7 26,5 16,1 17,3 1,9 16,5 2,4 18,0 1,1 21,8 1,6 20,6 1,5 22,8 0,7 19,5 2,9
UK 7,1 1,0 44,3 15,7 17,8 1,2 51,0 12,5 28,4 2,0 27,8 2,0 29,0 1,9 38,4 2,8 37,5 2,6 39,2 2,9 33,2 5,5
Germany 5,5 1,2 38,1 10,5 15,3 12,1 15,1 3,0 14,6 2,0 15,4 3,6 30,5 2,1 29,2 2,1 31,4 1,6 23,0 8,1
France 11,7 1,2 43,5 14,2 19,5 4,3 35,6 10,0 22,7 2,7 22,7 3,7 22,6 1,2 41,4 4,3 37,5 3,5 44,4 1,6 31,7 10,0
Japan 17,8 9,1 22,1 3,8 35,5 11,0 91,7 41,7 24,1 18,0 36,0 20,3 13,2 1,5 17,2 3,2 15,7 3,1 18,5 2,7 20,8 13,7
Canada 6,4 1,2 14,3 2,6 9,7 2,4 31,8 14,2 15,8 1,4 15,8 1,3 15,8 1,5 22,5 2,1 20,7 1,4 24,0 1,0 19,0 3,7
Italy 14,0 1,9 38,6 15,7 25,2 10,3 34,5 9,6 18,4 2,4 19,1 3,1 17,8 1,4 33,4 7,3 27,9 5,7 39,6 0,9 24,8 9,0
Belgium 22,2 8,1 32,5 6,1 25,8 5,2 24,6 5,6 26,9 4,7 49,9 4,8 47,7 5,9 51,7 2,8 37,1 13,0
Netherlands 8,5 0,3 17,4 4,8 15,9 3,7 59,0 26,7 26,0 4,1 27,0 5,7 25,1 1,7 52,4 4,4 49,9 5,1 54,3 2,5 38,4 13,9
Switzerland 2,2 0,4 5,9 0,4 5,1 0,9 16,9 3,3 8,6 1,3 9,6 1,3 7,8 0,5 9,5 0,7 9,5 0,8 9,5 0,6 9,0 1,1
Sweden 6,6 0,5 9,7 4,5 9,6 2,0 20,8 4,1 21,1 4,2 18,4 2,4 23,6 4,0 40,3 6,1 35,6 5,6 44,0 3,5 30,3 10,9
Denmark 6,2 1,2 6,6 2,3 6,7 1,0 8,2 1,1 18,4 5,9 13,9 1,2 22,5 5,6 39,1 4,2 36,0 4,3 41,5 2,2 28,4 11,5
Finland 9,1 2,3 14,5 4,2 16,6 1,8 41,8 11,3 21,7 2,0 22,2 2,7 21,2 1,0 31,4 5,9 27,5 2,3 34,5 6,1 26,2 6,4
Norway 7,6 1,4 7,0 2,5 9,2 1,6 17,4 6,6 19,3 1,7 19,0 1,9 19,6 1,6 38,9 2,5 37,2 2,0 40,2 2,0 28,6 10,0
G7 mean 8,1 2,0 26,1 8,9 16,1 5,5 38,7 14,9 17,7 3,9 19,1 4,3 16,5 1,5 25,7 2,9 23,6 2,5 27,5 1,4 21,5 6,6
G7 convergence 6,0 2,9 17,3 6,2 11,2 4,9 27,9 12,9 8,5 5,8 10,5 6,5 8,3 1,0 13,4 2,2 12,4 1,7 14,4 1,0 10,2 4,4
Total mean 7,5 1,6 19,3 6,4 14,2 4,2 33,4 11,7 18,9 3,7 19,2 3,7 18,6 2,1 31,1 3,5 28,8 3,1 33,1 2,1 24,7 8,0
Total converg. 4,7 2,2 15,4 5,5 9,1 4,1 23,1 11,1 7,2 4,3 8,4 4,8 7,5 1,6 14,6 2,1 13,7 1,9 15,4 1,5 10,2 4,5
Note: Convergence is defined as the standard deviation of each country's summary statistic around the grand mean of the group of countries.
Data Sources: See Data Appendix.54
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics on the Central Government Budget Deficit as a Percentage of National Income under Different Monetary Regimes.
14 Countries, 1881-1995. Annual Data: Mean and Standard Deviation.
Gold Standard WW I Interwar WW II Bretton Woods Floating Exchange Postwar
(Total) (Preconvertible) (Convertible) (Total) (High Inflation) (Low Inflation)
(1881-1913) (1914-1919) (1920-1938) (1939-1946) (1947-1971) (1947-1958) (1959-1971) (1973-1995) (1973-1982) (1983-1995) (1947-1995)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
USA -0,2 0,5 5,1 7,0 1,0 2,8 15,2 13,2 0,6 1,6 0,0 1,9 1,2 1,0 4,4 1,6 3,1 1,1 5,5 1,0 2,4 2,5
UK -0,3 1,3 24,1 14,8 0,6 2,7 20,2 12,5 1,8 4,0 2,3 5,5 1,4 1,7 4,0 2,8 5,1 2,3 3,2 2,9 2,9 3,6
Germany 0,5 0,4 23,5 11,8 2,7 3,3 45,3 35,4 1,0 1,8 1,8 2,7 0,5 0,5 2,4 1,6 2,0 0,7 2,7 2,0 1,7 1,8
France 0,9 1,8 33,1 16,8 5,4 6,9 2,8 7,5 6,8 11,3 0,3 0,9 2,8 1,8 2,1 2,0 3,3 1,4 2,7 5,2
Japan 3,3 6,8 1,3 1,6 5,0 3,9 41,1 32,1 1,9 4,2 3,0 2,7 0,8 5,1 5,4 3,6 6,4 4,5 4,2 1,7 3,3 4,3
Canada 1,1 1,5 11,4 4,6 0,9 2,7 17,3 10,3 1,6 2,3 0,2 2,5 2,8 1,1 5,6 1,7 4,9 1,8 6,1 1,5 3,5 2,8
Italy 1,4 1,4 28,0 16,4 3,5 6,5 24,2 8,6 4,6 5,6 6,1 7,8 3,2 1,5 11,5 1,9 10,9 1,8 12,0 1,8 7,8 5,4
Belgium 5,4 9,5 2,5 1,4 2,2 1,6 2,8 1,1 8,9 4,3 6,8 3,7 10,5 4,1 5,6 4,4
Netherlands 7,2 2,9 1,2 3,6 50,3 82,2 0,4 8,8 -0,6 12,9 1,4 0,9 3,8 2,2 3,3 2,2 4,3 2,2 2,0 6,6
Switzerland 4,0 0,8 0,4 1,5 6,7 3,4 -0,4 1,0 -0,7 1,4 -0,1 0,5 1,3 1,4 1,5 1,6 1,2 1,3 0,5 1,5
Sweden 0,5 0,7 2,4 1,8 0,6 1,2 6,3 4,9 1,3 1,2 1,5 1,1 1,1 1,3 6,6 5,0 6,9 3,9 6,3 5,8 3,8 4,4
Denmark 0,4 1,0 1,6 1,3 0,3 1,3 0,2 0,8 0,8 1,3 1,6 1,5 0,0 0,3 5,5 5,9 7,1 6,5 4,3 5,4 3,0 4,8
Finland 0,4 1,1 4,4 6,2 0,6 3,3 15,7 9,6 0,9 1,5 1,0 1,7 0,8 1,3 3,8 5,4 1,4 1,5 5,5 6,7 2,2 4,1
Norway 0,7 1,5 2,2 2,4 0,3 1,6 8,0 6,4 0,8 2,7 -0,3 3,5 1,8 1,1 3,4 4,1 4,5 3,7 2,3 4,3 2,2 3,8
G7 mean 0,9 2,0 18,1 10,4 2,7 4,1 27,2 18,7 2,0 3,8 2,9 4,9 1,5 1,7 5,2 2,1 4,9 2,0 5,3 1,8 3,5 3,6
G7 convergence 1,2 2,2 12,1 6,1 2,0 1,8 12,8 11,8 1,3 2,2 2,7 3,5 1,1 1,5 3,0 0,8 3,1 1,2 3,2 0,6 2,0 1,4
Total mean 0,8 1,6 11,4 6,8 2,0 3,6 20,9 18,3 1,5 3,2 1,8 4,2 1,3 1,3 5,0 3,1 4,7 2,7 5,1 3,0 3,1 3,9
Total converg. 1,0 1,8 11,5 6,0 2,0 2,4 16,4 22,8 1,2 2,5 2,3 3,8 1,0 1,2 2,7 1,6 2,7 1,6 3,0 1,9 1,8 1,4
Note: The budget deficit is defined as the change in end of year government debt. Germany excluded 1923-24.
Convergence is defined as the standard deviation of each country's summary statistic around the grand mean of the group of countries.
Data Sources: See Data Appendix.55
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics on the Central Government Debt as a Percentage of National Income under Different Monetary Regimes.
14 Countries, 1881-1995. Annual Data: Mean and Standard Deviation.
Gold Standard WW I Interwar WW II Bretton Woods Floating Exchange Postwar
(Total) (Preconvertible) (Convertible) (Total) (High Inflation) (Low Inflation)
(1881-1913) (1914-1919) (1920-1938) (1939-1946) (1947-1971) (1947-1958) (1959-1971) (1973-1995) (1973-1982) (1983-1995) (1947-1995)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
USA 7,6 3,8 10,0 11,2 29,4 9,5 73,6 37,0 60,9 21,4 78,7 16,4 44,4 7,4 45,3 13,0 33,5 1,1 54,4 10,2 53,0 19,3
UK 38,5 8,4 72,9 41,3 162,2 12,6 161,7 47,3 125,8 50,7 168,1 39,3 86,8 16,8 43,2 4,7 45,1 2,6 41,8 5,5 85,6 54,9
Germany 6,8 3,0 56,8 32,3 16,2 12,2 146,4 136,1 8,2 1,4 8,9 1,8 7,7 0,7 19,8 7,4 13,1 4,3 24,9 4,6 14,0 7,9
France 95,6 13,5 135,2 46,0 118,2 29,1 25,0 8,7 33,9 1,0 19,6 6,4 20,7 10,3 11,2 3,9 28,1 7,0 22,5 9,9
Japan 38,9 20,3 44,2 15,4 57,4 18,9 145,8 104,1 16,4 4,9 19,0 3,7 14,1 4,7 39,7 20,1 26,1 17,0 56,7 3,3 25,6 17,9
Canada 37,4 9,9 47,5 15,9 65,2 14,6 105,6 32,7 62,1 21,5 76,6 23,4 48,8 4,6 55,1 15,7 39,7 3,3 67,0 9,5 58,4 19,0
Italy 110,1 15,5 117,0 22,1 100,2 21,0 103,7 29,1 42,1 8,0 48,4 6,8 36,3 3,2 75,2 24,2 52,6 6,2 93,9 15,5 57,3 23,9
Belgium 90,1 24,6 60,5 14,8 62,2 19,9 59,0 8,3 84,7 35,6 49,6 12,2 113,9 16,0 71,3 29,0
Netherlands 51,5 4,7 59,9 11,5 204,1 149,9 71,2 56,1 111,7 58,1 33,9 6,8 42,9 18,4 23,6 6,6 57,6 6,5 56,9 44,2
Switzerland 13,2 3,8 22,3 3,2 45,1 11,9 22,3 13,4 34,5 7,6 11,0 4,4 15,1 3,7 13,3 3,7 16,6 3,1 18,7 10,6
Sweden 16,5 1,5 17,1 1,5 20,8 4,0 41,9 11,6 28,6 7,2 34,3 4,4 23,4 4,7 51,2 19,6 34,4 12,9 64,0 12,9 39,1 18,3
Denmark 18,6 3,3 13,5 0,9 20,3 3,1 11,1 1,9 12,4 4,5 15,2 3,2 9,8 3,9 47,3 26,4 21,8 19,4 66,9 5,9 28,6 25,4
Finland 12,9 1,2 12,8 6,2 15,6 5,4 53,5 18,3 15,7 7,7 20,3 8,9 11,5 2,0 18,2 18,8 7,0 3,3 26,9 21,2 16,7 13,9
Norway 19,5 4,5 14,5 3,3 31,6 6,8 44,6 22,7 27,8 7,5 31,4 9,6 24,5 2,0 34,4 6,2 38,1 5,7 30,7 4,4 30,8 7,6
G7 mean 47,8 10,6 69,1 26,3 78,4 16,8 122,8 64,4 48,7 16,6 61,9 13,2 36,8 6,3 42,7 13,6 31,6 5,5 52,4 8,0 45,2 21,8
G7 convergence 40,3 6,3 43,6 13,7 51,6 6,7 33,7 44,7 39,9 16,9 53,8 14,2 27,0 5,1 19,3 6,9 15,7 5,3 23,9 4,2 25,5 15,6
Total mean 36,6 7,7 46,6 15,7 57,8 12,6 94,8 50,2 41,4 16,3 53,1 14,6 30,8 5,4 42,3 16,0 29,2 7,3 53,1 9,0 41,3 21,6
Total converg. 34,9 6,4 41,1 15,4 45,1 8,2 59,4 50,6 32,1 16,8 44,0 16,4 22,7 3,9 20,6 9,2 14,9 5,7 27,7 5,5 22,4 13,7
Note: Convergence is defined as the standard deviation of each country's summary statistic around the grand mean of the group of countries.
Data Sources: See Data Appendix.56
Table 6 Descriptive Statistics on the Growth of Nominal Central Government Debt under Different Monetary Regimes.
14 Countries, 1881-1995. Annual Data: Mean and Standard Deviation.
Gold Standard WW I Interwar WW II Bretton Woods Floating Exchange Postwar
(Total) (Preconvertible) (Convertible) (Total) (High Inflation) (Low Inflation)
(1881-1913) (1914-1919) (1920-1938) (1939-1946) (1947-1971) (1947-1958) (1959-1971) (1973-1995) (1973-1982) (1983-1995) (1947-1995)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
USA -1,5 6,1 94,8 125,7 2,4 8,9 30,7 29,3 1,7 2,8 0,2 2,0 3,1 2,8 11,2 3,9 10,1 3,7 12,0 4,1 6,3 5,8
UK -0,4 3,5 55,2 37,8 0,4 1,9 15,0 11,2 1,4 2,4 1,2 2,5 1,6 2,3 10,4 7,6 13,2 6,5 8,3 8,0 5,8 7,0
Germany 10,3 10,2 90,2 76,7 23,6 38,3 53,9 14,8 10,6 18,7 16,0 29,6 7,2 6,3 15,0 8,7 19,3 9,2 11,6 7,0 12,9 14,2
France 1,0 2,0 32,8 15,3 4,2 5,3 4,3 6,1 9,4 4,5 1,6 5,2 18,1 17,3 23,6 25,0 13,8 5,6 11,2 15,1
Japan 9,2 19,8 4,6 5,4 9,5 6,0 38,2 16,2 18,0 12,6 18,9 15,8 17,0 9,0 17,2 12,7 27,5 11,3 8,2 3,8 17,7 12,5
Canada 3,2 5,1 33,7 12,0 1,1 3,8 22,3 12,5 3,7 4,3 0,9 3,9 6,3 2,8 12,2 5,0 14,2 4,8 10,6 4,6 7,8 6,2
Italy 1,3 1,3 33,0 23,2 3,1 7,1 32,4 11,6 8,8 4,2 7,6 2,4 9,8 5,1 19,8 7,4 26,0 3,4 15,1 5,9 14,5 8,1
Belgium 8,3 10,5 5,6 10,8 4,3 2,2 3,5 2,5 4,9 1,7 12,9 5,9 15,3 5,3 11,0 5,9 8,5 6,1
Netherlands 16,1 6,1 2,0 6,0 27,2 27,6 1,5 6,7 -2,3 7,5 5,0 3,4 11,6 7,8 15,3 8,6 8,7 6,0 6,3 8,7
Switzerland 53,4 28,5 1,7 7,1 18,6 9,3 -1,0 4,0 -2,0 3,4 -0,1 4,4 10,3 11,2 13,9 13,2 7,6 9,1 5,1 11,0
Sweden 3,3 4,6 16,8 14,4 2,7 5,6 22,2 23,3 5,1 5,0 4,8 4,0 5,4 6,0 16,6 11,5 23,9 8,4 11,0 10,4 10,7 10,3
Denmark 2,4 6,0 14,4 12,4 2,5 7,6 3,0 8,5 6,9 11,0 13,4 12,6 0,8 3,6 24,0 29,5 45,6 33,1 7,3 9,2 15,1 23,1
Finland 3,5 9,7 74,4 131,0 5,7 19,5 57,4 57,4 5,9 9,8 4,4 6,4 7,3 12,2 24,8 27,4 26,0 28,2 23,8 27,8 14,5 22,1
Norway 4,1 8,2 20,5 24,6 2,0 5,9 23,2 19,2 5,0 8,5 1,4 10,0 8,3 5,2 11,2 12,3 13,6 10,8 8,8 13,8 8,8 12,6
G7 mean 3,3 6,9 49,2 42,3 6,3 10,2 32,1 15,9 6,9 7,3 7,7 8,7 6,7 4,8 14,8 8,9 19,1 9,1 11,4 5,6 10,9 9,8
G7 convergence 4,6 6,4 33,1 43,8 8,2 12,6 13,4 6,8 6,0 6,1 7,5 10,4 5,5 2,4 3,7 4,6 6,8 7,6 2,6 1,5 4,5 4,0
Total mean 3,7 7,3 41,5 39,5 4,7 9,5 28,7 20,1 5,4 7,0 5,5 7,6 5,6 5,0 15,4 12,0 20,5 12,2 11,3 8,7 10,4 11,6
Total converg. 3,7 5,0 29,8 43,6 5,9 9,2 15,5 13,6 4,7 4,7 6,7 7,6 4,4 2,8 4,9 7,8 9,2 9,5 4,3 6,2 4,0 5,5
Note: Germany excluded 1923-24.
Convergence is defined as the standard deviation of each country's summary statistic around the grand mean of the group of countries.
Data Sources: See Data Appendix.57
Table 7 Descriptive Statistics on the Rate of Inflation under Different Monetary Regimes.
14 Countries, 1881-1995. Annual Data: Mean and Standard Deviation.
Gold Standard WW I Interwar WW II Bretton Woods Floating Exchange Postwar
(Total) (Preconvertible) (Convertible) (Total) (High Inflation) (Low Inflation)
(1881-1913) (1914-1919) (1920-1938) (1939-1946) (1947-1971) (1947-1958) (1959-1971) (1973-1995) (1973-1982) (1983-1995) (1947-1995)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
USA 0,1 2,1 9,9 7,7 -0,9 6,0 4,2 4,1 3,0 3,3 3,5 4,5 2,6 1,8 5,8 3,2 8,8 2,7 3,6 1,0 4,4 3,5
UK -0,1 2,5 13,5 8,1 -1,5 6,7 5,6 4,1 4,1 2,4 4,2 2,5 4,0 2,3 8,9 5,9 14,2 5,0 4,8 2,1 6,4 5,0
Germany 0,9 2,4 31,5 18,9 -0,2 4,9 4,6 7,4 2,3 2,8 1,9 4,0 2,6 1,1 3,7 2,0 5,2 1,4 2,5 1,5 3,0 2,5
France 0,1 1,3 17,9 9,6 6,0 13,9 26,2 15,9 9,3 14,3 14,7 19,6 4,3 1,4 7,0 4,3 11,1 2,1 3,8 2,4 8,1 10,6
Japan 2,4 5,4 24,7 22,6 -3,4 9,5 76,3 177,1 13,1 27,0 21,6 37,8 5,3 1,9 4,7 5,4 8,7 6,0 1,5 1,1 9,0 19,9
Canada 0,7 3,9 8,7 6,8 -1,1 6,1 2,5 2,3 3,3 3,4 4,2 4,7 2,5 1,3 6,3 3,4 9,6 1,7 3,7 1,7 4,7 3,7
Italy 0,1 2,2 19,1 18,8 3,0 10,2 72,4 114,5 5,8 12,1 8,2 17,4 3,6 2,1 10,9 5,7 16,3 3,2 6,8 3,0 8,2 9,7
Belgium 0,2 5,0 3,4 10,7 2,8 3,5 2,8 4,9 2,8 1,4 5,3 3,4 8,1 2,9 3,2 2,0 4,0 3,6
Netherlands -0,2 3,6 10,2 7,4 -2,0 5,1 8,0 7,4 4,3 2,9 4,6 3,7 4,1 2,2 4,2 3,1 7,1 2,1 2,0 1,3 4,3 3,0
Switzerland 0,8 1,6 14,6 9,5 -2,4 5,3 5,5 5,8 2,4 2,0 1,6 2,0 3,1 1,7 3,8 2,5 4,9 3,1 2,9 1,6 3,1 2,4
Sweden 0,4 3,2 18,4 13,0 -2,4 5,7 4,6 5,7 4,2 3,2 4,3 4,2 4,1 2,0 7,7 3,2 10,0 2,1 5,9 2,8 5,9 3,6
Denmark 0,2 3,7 15,0 6,0 -1,0 8,1 6,1 8,7 4,5 2,7 3,7 3,0 5,2 2,3 6,8 4,0 10,8 1,9 3,6 1,8 5,6 3,5
Finland 0,6 4,8 63,0 94,9 0,9 6,7 22,0 18,9 7,5 8,8 10,5 11,9 4,7 2,7 7,7 4,8 12,1 3,4 4,4 2,4 7,6 7,0
Norway 0,6 3,3 17,7 14,0 -1,8 8,1 6,1 6,9 4,1 4,0 4,1 5,3 4,1 2,5 6,9 3,4 9,6 2,5 4,9 2,5 5,5 3,9
G7 mean 0,6 2,8 17,9 13,2 0,3 8,2 27,4 46,5 5,8 9,3 8,3 12,9 3,6 1,7 6,7 4,3 10,6 3,2 3,8 1,8 6,3 7,8
G7 convergence 0,9 1,4 8,2 6,6 3,2 3,2 33,1 70,3 4,0 9,2 7,2 13,0 1,0 0,4 2,5 1,5 3,7 1,7 1,7 0,7 2,3 6,2
Total mean 0,5 3,2 20,3 18,3 -0,2 7,6 18,8 29,1 5,0 6,6 6,4 9,0 3,8 1,9 6,4 3,9 9,7 2,9 3,8 1,9 5,7 5,8
Total converg. 0,7 1,3 14,2 23,6 2,7 2,6 25,7 53,5 3,0 7,0 5,6 10,0 0,9 0,5 2,0 1,2 3,1 1,3 1,4 0,6 1,9 4,8
Note: Germany excluded 1920-24.
Convergence is defined as the standard deviation of each country's summary statistic around the grand mean of the group of countries.
Data Sources: See Data Appendix.58
Table 8 Descriptive Statistics on the Long Term Interest Rate under Different Monetary Regimes.
14 Countries, 1881-1995. Annual Data: Mean and Standard Deviation.
Gold Standard WW I Interwar WW II Bretton Woods Floating Exchange Postwar
(Total) (Preconvertible) (Convertible) (Total) (High Inflation) (Low Inflation)
(1881-1913) (1914-1919) (1920-1938) (1939-1946) (1947-1971) (1947-1958) (1959-1971) (1973-1995) (1973-1982) (1983-1995) (1947-1995)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
USA 3,8 0,3 4,3 0,3 4,2 0,6 2,6 0,1 4,1 1,4 3,0 0,4 5,2 1,2 9,0 2,1 9,7 2,3 8,5 1,9 6,5 3,0
UK 2,9 0,2 4,2 0,5 4,1 0,7 3,1 0,3 5,5 1,8 4,0 0,7 6,8 1,4 11,2 2,2 13,4 1,3 9,6 1,1 8,2 3,5
Germany 3,7 0,2 5,3 0,5 6,8 1,7 6,4 0,8 5,9 0,5 6,8 0,8 7,9 1,4 8,7 1,5 7,2 1,1 7,2 1,4
France 3,2 0,3 4,6 0,5 4,6 0,9 3,3 0,4 5,7 0,9 5,6 0,7 5,9 1,1 10,1 2,4 11,0 2,8 9,4 2,0 7,8 2,8
Japan 6,5 2,0 8,1 1,1 5,2 1,5 6,6 1,8
Canada 3,5 0,4 4,6 0,7 4,5 0,9 3,0 0,2 4,7 1,6 3,3 0,5 5,9 1,0 10,2 2,0 10,5 2,6 9,9 1,4 7,3 3,3
Italy 4,2 0,5 4,8 0,7 5,9 0,6 6,2 0,9 6,1 0,7 6,4 0,4 5,8 0,8 12,9 3,5 13,8 4,5 12,2 2,3 9,3 4,2
Belgium 3,2 0,2 4,7 0,8 4,2 0,3 5,4 1,1 4,5 0,2 6,2 1,0 9,4 2,0 10,0 2,3 9,0 1,6 7,3 2,5
Netherlands 3,2 0,3 4,2 0,5 4,0 0,7 3,3 0,4 4,4 1,4 3,4 0,4 5,4 1,3 8,2 1,4 9,2 1,2 7,5 1,0 6,3 2,3
Switzerland 3,7 0,3 5,0 0,6 4,7 0,9 3,4 0,3 3,5 0,9 3,0 0,3 4,0 0,9 4,9 1,0 5,0 1,2 4,9 0,9 4,2 1,2
Sweden 3,8 0,3 4,3 0,3 4,2 0,8 3,4 0,4 4,7 1,5 3,4 0,5 5,9 1,0 10,7 1,7 10,2 2,1 11,1 1,4 7,6 3,4
Denmark 3,7 0,2 4,9 0,3 4,9 0,6 4,2 0,5 6,3 1,9 5,0 0,7 7,6 1,8 12,4 3,6 15,3 2,9 10,2 2,2 9,3 4,1
Finland 7,9 0,6 10,1 1,5 9,9 0,9 10,3 1,8 9,4 1,6
Norway 4,0 0,3 5,8 0,7 5,0 0,7 3,5 1,0 4,2 1,1 3,4 0,9 4,9 0,6 9,9 2,6 8,8 2,4 10,7 2,6 6,9 3,4
G7 mean 3,5 0,3 4,6 0,5 5,0 0,9 3,7 0,4 5,4 1,2 4,7 0,5 6,1 1,1 9,7 2,2 10,7 2,3 8,9 1,6 7,6 2,8
G7 convergence 0,5 0,1 0,4 0,2 1,1 0,4 1,5 0,3 0,9 0,5 1,4 0,1 0,6 0,2 2,1 0,6 2,2 1,2 2,2 0,5 1,0 1,0
Total mean 3,6 0,3 4,7 0,5 4,8 0,8 3,7 0,4 5,1 1,3 4,2 0,5 6,0 1,0 9,5 2,1 10,2 2,1 9,0 1,6 7,4 2,7
Total converg. 0,4 0,1 0,5 0,1 0,8 0,3 1,0 0,3 0,9 0,4 1,2 0,2 1,1 0,3 2,2 0,7 2,6 1,0 2,1 0,5 1,4 1,0
Note: Convergence is defined as the standard deviation of each country's summary statistic around the grand mean of the group of countries.
Data Sources: See Data Appendix.59
Table 9 Descriptive Statistics on Exchange Rate Volatility under Different Monetary Regimes.
14 Countries, 1881-1995. Annual Data: Mean and Standard Deviation.
Gold Standard WW I Interwar WW II Bretton Woods Floating Exchange Postwar
(Total) (Preconvertible) (Convertible) (Total) (High Inflation) (Low Inflation)
(1881-1913) (1914-1919) (1920-1938) (1939-1946) (1947-1971) (1947-1958) (1959-1971) (1973-1995) (1973-1982) (1983-1995) (1947-1995)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
USA
UK 0,2 0,2 2,1 3,0 6,9 8,5 2,5 4,7 2,4 7,2 3,4 9,6 1,4 4,1 8,7 6,0 9,7 6,6 8,0 5,7 5,3 7,3
Germany 0,2 0,1 47,6 88,9 25,5 57,2 0,1 0,1 3,1 8,3 5,0 11,6 1,4 2,3 8,9 7,0 8,9 7,2 8,8 7,1 5,9 8,1
France 0,3 0,2 12,6 21,5 18,4 19,8 21,9 46,8 8,9 31,8 16,0 45,6 2,3 5,1 10,0 7,3 10,9 8,4 9,3 6,6 9,4 23,1
Japan 3,0 4,8 1,2 0,7 7,5 10,8 24,7 42,7 25,0 79,9 51,9 111,4 0,2 0,7 8,2 6,9 7,4 6,5 8,8 7,4 16,9 57,3
Canada 0,0 0,0 0,8 1,2 2,6 3,4 1,5 2,1 2,2 2,3 2,9 2,6 1,5 1,9 3,6 2,4 3,4 2,5 3,8 2,4 2,9 2,4
Italy 1,4 1,5 9,2 5,5 16,4 31,9 52,4 84,9 5,4 18,0 11,1 25,3 0,2 0,3 10,1 9,9 10,6 11,8 9,7 8,6 7,6 14,6
Belgium 2,7 3,1 12,5 10,3 12,7 15,4 5,8 14,3 0,6 2,1 1,1 3,0 0,1 0,5 9,7 7,6 9,9 9,0 9,5 6,8 5,1 7,1
Netherlands 6,0 8,0 5,6 7,9 5,6 14,4 1,9 6,1 3,3 8,7 0,6 1,3 8,9 6,8 8,7 6,9 9,1 7,1 5,3 7,3
Switzerland 7,4 7,0 6,4 9,4 0,6 0,8 0,3 1,1 0,1 0,5 0,4 1,5 9,6 7,5 9,7 8,1 9,5 7,4 4,8 7,0
Sweden 0,2 0,2 9,3 11,0 6,9 10,2 0,8 1,7 2,3 8,4 4,8 11,8 0,1 0,3 8,8 8,7 7,5 8,0 9,8 9,4 5,5 9,0
Denmark 0,2 0,1 8,2 11,4 10,6 12,8 3,5 3,6 2,3 6,9 4,0 9,6 0,7 2,2 9,1 7,0 8,9 7,9 9,2 6,6 5,6 7,6
Finland 19,2 27,5 15,7 28,2 19,1 35,8 5,5 10,6 8,9 13,3 2,3 6,2 8,9 6,5 6,0 4,6 11,2 7,0 7,0 8,9
Norway 7,7 9,6 12,4 13,4 3,5 4,6 1,9 6,3 3,9 8,8 0,1 0,3 7,4 4,8 6,5 5,2 8,0 4,5 4,6 6,1
G7 mean 0,7 1,0 10,5 17,3 11,0 18,8 14,7 25,9 6,7 21,1 12,9 29,4 1,0 2,1 7,1 5,6 7,3 6,2 6,9 5,4 6,9 16,1
G7 convergence 1,1 1,8 17,0 32,5 9,3 20,0 19,7 33,1 8,6 28,1 18,0 39,4 0,9 2,0 3,8 3,3 4,1 3,9 3,6 3,1 5,4 19,7
Total mean 0,8 1,0 10,3 14,7 10,6 16,3 10,1 18,3 4,4 13,5 8,3 18,7 0,8 1,9 8,0 6,3 7,7 6,6 8,2 6,2 6,1 11,8
Total converg. 1,1 1,7 12,0 22,7 6,8 14,6 14,8 25,2 6,4 20,8 13,3 29,1 0,8 2,0 2,8 2,5 3,0 2,9 2,9 2,4 3,8 14,1
Note: Absolute rate of change. Germany excluded 1922-23.
Convergence is defined as the standard deviation of each country's summary statistic around the grand mean of the group of countries.
Data Sources: See Data Appendix.60
Table 10 Descriptive Statistics on the Real per Capita Income Growth under Different Monetary Regimes.
14 Countries, 1881-1995. Annual Data: Mean and Standard Deviation.
Gold Standard WW I Interwar WW II Bretton Woods Floating Exchange Postwar
(Total) (Preconvertible) (Convertible) (Total) (High Inflation) (Low Inflation)
(1881-1913) (1914-1919) (1920-1938) (1939-1946) (1947-1971) (1947-1958) (1959-1971) (1973-1995) (1973-1982) (1983-1995) (1947-1995)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
USA 1,5 5,0 1,1 8,6 0,5 8,1 5,5 10,3 1,9 2,8 1,3 3,6 2,4 1,7 1,4 2,2 0,9 2,8 1,8 1,7 1,7 2,5
UK 0,9 3,0 0,3 5,1 0,8 4,3 1,5 6,4 2,1 1,7 1,7 2,0 2,5 1,4 1,8 2,5 1,4 3,0 2,2 2,2 2,0 2,1
Germany 1,8 2,9 -8,8 2,9 5,9 12,5 -5,2 14,3 5,0 3,4 6,3 4,0 3,8 2,3 2,0 2,1 1,9 2,8 2,2 1,4 3,6 3,2
France 1,6 3,2 -2,9 14,0 2,8 6,9 0,1 23,8 4,9 2,1 5,0 2,9 4,8 1,2 1,8 1,6 2,2 1,6 1,4 1,5 3,4 2,4
Japan 1,7 3,9 5,0 3,1 2,5 6,5 -6,5 17,6 7,8 3,0 6,8 3,1 8,7 2,6 2,8 1,9 2,9 2,1 2,7 1,9 5,4 3,5
Canada 2,8 4,7 -1,0 8,7 1,0 8,2 5,9 7,9 2,6 2,6 2,0 3,3 3,1 1,7 1,8 3,0 2,3 2,9 1,4 3,2 2,2 2,8
Italy 0,9 3,9 -1,2 1,9 1,5 4,1 -1,0 25,4 5,2 2,6 5,9 3,1 4,6 2,1 2,5 2,3 3,0 3,1 2,0 1,4 3,9 2,8
Belgium 1,7 3,6 3,4 2,1 2,3 2,3 4,2 1,4 2,0 2,0 2,3 2,5 1,7 1,5 2,7 2,1
Netherlands 0,8 4,9 0,8 11,6 1,4 3,8 1,0 28,8 4,4 3,4 4,5 4,3 4,4 2,7 1,7 1,6 1,3 2,1 2,0 1,2 3,1 3,0
Switzerland 1,4 4,0 1,1 5,1 3,0 3,0 2,4 4,0 3,5 1,7 0,8 2,3 0,7 3,0 0,9 1,6 1,9 2,9
Sweden 2,2 2,2 -1,1 6,3 3,5 3,7 2,0 3,0 3,2 1,6 2,7 1,3 3,6 1,7 1,3 1,9 1,5 1,7 1,2 2,1 2,3 1,9
Denmark 1,8 1,7 0,0 7,7 2,2 3,9 2,0 19,3 3,3 2,5 2,8 2,8 3,8 2,2 1,8 2,0 1,4 2,5 2,0 1,6 2,6 2,4
Finland 1,9 3,0 -3,2 13,0 4,2 3,9 0,3 6,0 4,1 2,7 3,6 2,7 4,6 2,8 2,0 3,3 2,8 2,5 1,3 3,8 3,2 3,2
Norway 1,5 1,7 1,3 8,8 2,8 5,0 0,4 8,6 3,6 2,6 3,7 3,5 3,6 1,4 3,1 1,9 3,5 1,9 2,8 1,9 3,4 2,2
G7 mean 1,6 3,8 -1,1 6,3 2,2 7,2 0,0 15,1 4,2 2,6 4,1 3,1 4,3 1,9 2,0 2,2 2,1 2,6 2,0 1,9 3,2 2,8
G7 convergence 0,6 0,8 4,2 4,3 1,8 2,8 4,8 7,5 2,1 0,5 2,4 0,6 2,2 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,8 0,5 0,5 0,6 1,3 0,5
Total mean 1,6 3,4 -0,8 7,7 2,4 5,7 0,5 13,6 3,9 2,6 3,6 3,1 4,1 1,9 1,9 2,2 2,0 2,5 1,8 1,9 3,0 2,7
Total converg. 0,5 1,1 3,3 4,0 1,5 2,6 3,5 8,6 1,5 0,6 1,8 0,8 1,5 0,5 0,6 0,5 0,8 0,5 0,5 0,7 1,0 0,5
Note: Convergence is defined as the standard deviation of each country's summary statistic around the grand mean of the group of countries.
Data Sources: See Data Appendix.61
Table 11 Descriptive Statistics on Seigniorage as a Percentage of National Income under Different Monetary Regimes.
14 Countries, 1881-1995. Annual Data: Mean and Standard Deviation.
Gold Standard WW I Interwar WW II Bretton Woods Floating Exchange Postwar
(Total) (Preconvertible) (Convertible) (Total) (High Inflation) (Low Inflation)
(1881-1913) (1914-1919) (1920-1938) (1939-1946) (1947-1971) (1947-1958) (1959-1971) (1973-1995) (1973-1982) (1983-1995) (1947-1995)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
USA 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,1 0,5 1,5 0,8 0,2 0,8 0,0 1,1 0,3 0,2 0,4 0,1 0,4 0,1 0,4 0,2 0,3 0,6
UK 0,0 0,0 1,5 0,4 0,1 0,4 1,2 0,5 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,5 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,6 0,6 0,7 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5
Germany 0,2 0,2 7,3 3,1 2,0 4,1 5,6 3,5 0,9 0,5 1,1 0,3 0,8 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,8 0,6
France 0,3 0,3 7,2 2,9 1,1 1,2 13,9 7,4 1,5 1,1 2,0 1,3 1,0 0,6 0,3 0,7 0,4 1,0 0,1 0,4 0,9 1,1
Japan 0,5 0,9 2,0 1,6 0,2 0,8 13,0 22,6 1,6 1,9 1,9 2,8 1,2 0,3 0,7 0,6 0,9 0,7 0,6 0,5 1,2 1,5
Canada 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,5 0,0 0,3 1,1 0,5 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,6 0,3 0,1 0,1 0,3 0,3
Italy 0,2 0,6 6,3 2,1 0,1 2,7 10,2 8,8 2,0 2,0 1,7 1,7 2,2 2,2 1,7 1,5 2,8 1,2 0,9 1,1 1,9 1,7
Belgium 2,7 4,0 1,6 1,8 20,1 13,4 1,9 5,0 3,0 7,2 0,8 0,5 0,3 0,4 0,7 0,5 0,1 0,2 1,1 3,6
Netherlands 3,1 1,7 0,0 1,4 13,0 11,3 0,7 0,7 0,8 0,9 0,6 0,4 0,5 0,7 0,5 0,2 0,5 0,9 0,6 0,7
Switzerland 0,3 0,7 1,8 1,3 0,4 1,5 2,4 1,0 1,6 1,2 1,1 1,1 2,0 1,2 0,3 1,4 0,7 1,6 0,0 1,1 1,0 1,4
Sweden 0,3 0,4 1,3 1,2 0,1 0,6 1,3 0,7 0,5 0,4 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,1 0,8 1,2 0,8 1,0 0,8 1,3 0,7 0,9
Denmark 0,2 2,0 1,4 0,8 -0,1 0,6 1,7 0,8 0,3 0,8 0,2 1,0 0,5 0,6 0,5 1,3 0,3 0,5 0,6 1,7 0,4 1,0
Finland 0,2 0,8 5,1 4,1 0,2 0,6 3,4 1,4 0,4 0,3 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,7 1,0 0,5 0,5 0,9 1,3 0,5 0,7
Norway 0,2 0,3 1,5 0,7 0,0 0,6 0,7 1,3 0,7 1,9 0,7 0,3 0,5 0,4 0,8 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,6 0,9
G7 mean 0,2 0,4 3,1 1,4 0,4 1,2 5,8 5,5 0,9 0,9 0,9 1,0 0,8 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,8 0,6 0,4 0,4 0,7 0,8
G7 convergence 0,2 0,3 3,2 1,2 0,7 1,4 5,8 7,7 0,7 0,7 0,9 0,9 0,7 0,7 0,5 0,5 0,9 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,6 0,6
Total mean 0,2 0,5 2,8 1,6 0,4 1,1 6,3 5,2 0,9 1,1 0,9 1,4 0,8 0,5 0,5 0,7 0,7 0,6 0,4 0,7 0,7 1,0
Total converg. 0,1 0,5 2,5 1,3 0,6 1,1 6,4 6,7 0,7 1,2 0,9 1,8 0,6 0,6 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,4 0,3 0,5 0,5 0,9
Note: Seigniorage is defined as the change in banknote circulation 1881-1948 and the change in M0 1949-1995. Germany excluded 1920-24, Belgium 1944, Denmark, France and Netherlands excluded 1945.
Convergence is defined as the standard deviation of each country's summary statistic around the grand mean of the group of countries.
Data Sources: See Data Appendix.Economic Papers*
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